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California State Auditor Logo COMMITMENT • INTEGRITY • LEADERSHIP

Public Safety Realignment
Weak State and County Oversight Does Not Ensure That Funds Are Spent Effectively

Report Number: 2020-102

Figure 1

Figure 1 is a diagram that reflects the organizational structure of different public safety realignment accounts through which the State pays counties realignment funding. The first and largest part of the organizational graphic reflects the structure of the accounts in the Local Revenue Fund 2011. The Local Revenue Fund 2011 includes two accounts—Law Enforcement Services Account and the Support Services Account. The Law Enforcement Services account includes six subaccounts: Trial Court Security, District Attorney and Public Defender, Community Corrections, Local Innovation, Juvenile Justice and Enhancing Law Enforcement Activities.  Each of these accounts includes a description of the purpose of the funding. For example, the Community Corrections account funding can be used for housing realigned inmates in county jails and supervising probationers, while the Local Innovation account supports local needs according to the discretion of the county board of supervisors. The Support Services account includes the Protective Services and Behavioral Health Accounts. Counties can use these funds to pay for services like adult protective services and child welfare services, and Medi-Cal substance abuse treatment programs and specialty mental health services, respectively. Below the organizational graphic of the Local Revenue Fund 2011, we included two additional funds which the Legislature created after it enacted the 2011 realignment legislation. These two funds are the Recidivism Reduction Fund and the Community Corrections Performance Incentive Fund. Counties can use these two funding sources to support programs that are known to reduce recidivism and enhance public safety, and to supervise and provide rehabilitative services for adult felony offenders, among other things.

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Figure 2

A bar graph that compares the average daily population (ADP) at Los Angeles’s jails, including the number of realigned inmates, with Los Angeles’s jail capacity from 2010 to 2019. The ADP for each year is represented by a bar with comprised of two parts: the ADP of inmates that are not realigned, and the ADP of realigned inmates. A line running horizontally across the graph represents Los Angeles’s jail capacity. The ADP of all inmates at Los Angeles stays fairly consistent from 2010 to 2019. In 2012, the ADP of realigned inmates begins to comprise approximately 20% of the ADP of all inmates, a trend that stays consistent for the remaining years shown in the graph. Los Angeles’s jail capacity decreases from 14,000 to 12,500 in the year 2017. In each year, the ADP of inmates exceeds Los Angeles’s jail capacity.

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Figure 3

A bar graph that compares the average daily population (ADP) in Fresno’s jails, including the number of realigned inmates, with Fresno’s jail capacity from 2010 to 2019. The ADP for each year is represented by a bar with comprised of two parts: the ADP of inmates that are not realigned, and the ADP of realigned inmates. A line running horizontally across the graph represents Fresno’s jail capacity. Fresno’s ADP in 2010 and 2011 is about 2000. However, after realignment, the ADP begins increasing in 2012 to about 2,500. From 2012-2019, Fresno’s ADP fluctuates between 2,500 and 3,000. Between 2012 and 2019, the ADP of realigned inmates comprises between 20% and 25% of the ADP of all inmates. Fresno’s jail capacity stays consistent at 2,700 for the entirety of the graph. Although its ADP does not exceed jail capacity between 2010 and 2012, Fresno exceeds its capacity for every year between 2013 and 2019, except for the year 2015.

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Figure 4

A bar graph that compares the average daily population of inmates in Alameda’s jails, including the number of realigned inmates, with Alameda’s jail capacity from 2010 to 2019.  The ADP for each year is represented by a bar with comprised of two parts: the ADP of inmates that are not realigned, and the ADP of realigned inmates. A line running horizontally across the graph represents Alameda’s jail capacity. The ADP of all inmates at Alameda decreases at a fairly consistent rate, from an ADP of 4,000 in 2010 to an ADP of 2,500 in 2019. For all years except 2010, the ADP of realigned inmates comprises only a small fraction of the ADP of all inmates. Although Alameda’s jail capacity decreases from 4,700 to 4,400 in the year 2018, its ADP does not exceed jail capacity for any of the years shown in the graph.

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Figure 5

A line graph that shows the percentage of medium and maximum-risk inmates at Alameda, Fresno, and Los Angeles from 2010 to 2019, with a separate line for each county. Fresno’s percentage of medium and maximum-risk inmates decreased gradually from 28 percent in 2010 to 21 percent in 2019. The figure notes that due to changes in their jail management systems, Alameda’s and Los Angeles’s inmate risk level begins in 2015. Medium and maximum-risk inmates at Alameda increased from 25 percent in 2015 to more than 34 percent in 2019, and over the same time period the percentage of medium and maximum-risk inmates at Los Angeles increased from 70 to 80 percent.

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Figure 6

Two stacked bar graphs showing the amount of realignment funds spent by the Sherriff’s department, Probation department, and non-law enforcement agencies spent at Alameda and Los Angeles during fiscal year 2019-20. Non-law enforcement departments, such as the district attorney, public defender, health care services departments, and social services departments, spent the majority of realignment funds in fiscal year 2019-20 at both counties. At Alameda, the probation department and sheriff’s department spent $36 million and $68 million, respectively, of realignment funds, while other county departments spent the remaining $209 million of the counties’ total realignment funds. At Los Angeles, the probation department spent $362 million, while the sheriff’s department spent $424 million and other county departments spent the remaining $1.7 billion of Los Angeles’s total realignment funds.

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Figure 7

A bar graph comparing the percentage of realignment funds that Los Angeles, Fresno, and Alameda did and did not report to the Corrections Board in fiscal year 2019-20. The graph shows that Los Angeles did not report 82 percent of its realignment funds and only reported 18 percent, that Fresno did not report 81 percent of its realignment funds and only reported 19 percent, and that Alameda did not report 84 percent of its realignment funds and only reported 15 percent.

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Figure A.1

Two separate line graphs showing the number of inmates released by Los Angeles and Fresno due to a lack of jail capacity from 2010 through 2019. The line graph for Fresno shows that the number of inmates it released due to lack of capacity increased slightly from 13,300 inmates in 2010 to 18,700 inmates in 2012, but then decreased significantly to only 3,800 inmates by 2019. The line graph for Los Angeles shows that the number of inmates released due to lack of capacity decreased steadily from 38,800 inmates in 2010 to only 1,700 inmates in 2019.

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Figure A.2

A line graph comparing the number of jail inmates to the number of jail staff at Alameda, Fresno, and Los Angeles counties from 2013 through 2019.  Alameda experienced a decrease from about 5.5 inmates to each jail staff member in 2013 to about 3.7 inmates to each jail staff member in 2019. Los Angeles experienced a slight increase from 3 inmates to each jail staff member in 2013 to 3.5 inmates to each jail staff member in 2019. Fresno experienced a slight decrease from 3 inmates to each jail staff member in 2013 to 2.6 inmates to each jail staff member in 2019.

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Figure A.3

Three separate bar graphs for Alameda, Fresno, and Los Angeles, with each graph containing one stacked bar for 2010 and one for 2018. The stacked bar graph for Alameda shows that in 2010, 26 percent of its inmates were Hispanic; 40 percent were black; 25 percent were white; five percent were either Asian or Pacific Islanders; and the all other races comprised the remaining four percent of inmates. In 2018, inmates in Alameda’s jails were 30 percent Hispanic; 38 percent black; 23 percent white; eight percent Asian or Pacific Islander; with all other races comprising the remaining two percent. The 2010 stacked bar graph for Fresno shows that 56 percent of its jail inmates were Hispanic, 16 percent were black, 24 percent were white, and the remaining four percent were either Asian or Pacific Islander. In 2018, inmates in Fresno’s jails were 59 percent of inmates Hispanic, 15 percent were black, 21 percent were white, three percent were Asian or Pacific Islander, and all other races comprised the remaining two percent of inmates in Fresno. The 2010 stacked bar graph for Los Angeles shows that 48 percent of its inmates were Hispanic, 33 percent were black, 15 percent were white, and all other races made up four percent. In 2018, of the inmates in Los Angeles’s jails 52 percent were  Hispanic; 29 percent were black; 15 percent were white; and all other races made up the remaining four percent.

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Figure A.4

Three separate bar graphs for Alameda, Fresno, and Los Angeles counties, with each graph containing one stacked bar for 2010 and one for 2018. At Alameda, 80 percent of its inmates were male and 20 percent of its inmates were female in 2010, while 79 percent of its inmates were male and 21 percent of its inmates were female in 2018. At Fresno , 82 percent of its inmates were male and 18 percent of its inmates were female in 2010, while 83 percent of its inmates were male and 17 percent of its inmates were female in 2018. At Los Angeles , 89 percent of its inmates were male and 11 percent of its inmates were female in 2010, while 87 percent of its inmates were male and 13 percent of its inmates were female in 2018.

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Figure A.5

Three separate line graphs for Alameda, Fresno, and Los Angeles, with each graph featuring three lines representing the percentage of minimum, medium, and maximum security risk inmates for each county. At Alameda, the majority of its inmates were minimum security, decreasing slightly from about 60 percent in 2015 to 55 percent in 2019, while medium security inmates increased from 10 percent to about 15 percent and maximum security inmates increased from 15 percent to 20 percent over the same period. At Fresno, minimum security inmates made up approximately 50 percent of all inmates from 2015 to 2018 and decreased to about 45 percent in 2019. Medium security inmates decreased from 20 percent to 15 percent from 2015 to 2019 and maximum security inmates comprised about 15 percent consistently during the same period. At Los Angeles, minimum security inmates decreased steadily from about 30 percent in 2015, to 20 percent in 2019. Medium security inmates, which were the majority of inmates in Los Angeles County, increased gradually from 55 percent in 2015 to about 65 percent in 2019, and maximum security inmates stayed consistent at approximately 15 percent of all inmates during the same period.

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Figure A.6

Three separate pie charts for Alameda, Fresno, and Los Angeles showing the different causes of inmate death at each county and the percentages of inmate deaths attributed to each cause between 2011 and 2019. In all three counties, most inmate deaths were due to natural causes. In Alameda, 47 percent of its inmate deaths were due to natural causes; 30 percent were due to suicide; 16 percent were caused by accidents; five percent were homicides; and the remaining two percent of deaths were due to other causes. In Fresno , 50 percent of its inmate deaths were due to natural causes; 26 percent were due to suicide; 15 percent were caused by accidents; and nine percent were homicides. In Los Angeles , 52 percent of its inmate deaths were due to natural causes; 20 percent were caused by accidents; 17 percent were due to suicide; four percent were homicides; and the remaining seven percent were due to other causes. 

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