

## Department of Social Services

### For the CalWORKs and Food Stamp Programs, It Lacks Assessments of Cost-Effectiveness and Misses Opportunities to Improve Counties' Antifraud Efforts

REPORT NUMBER 2009-101, NOVEMBER 2009

#### *Department of Social Services' response as of November 2010*

The Joint Legislative Audit Committee (audit committee) asked the Bureau of State Audits (bureau) to determine the fraud prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution structure for the California Work Opportunities and Responsibility to Kids (CalWORKs) and the federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (food stamp) programs at the state and local levels and the types of early fraud detection or antifraud programs used. Additionally, the audit committee requested that the bureau determine, to the extent possible, the cost-effectiveness of the fraud prevention efforts at the state and county levels, and to review how recovered overpayments are used. Further, we were asked to estimate, to the extent possible, the savings resulting from fraud deterred by counties' antifraud activities and whether early fraud detection programs are more cost-effective than ongoing investigations and prosecutions. Lastly, we were asked to assess the Department of Social Services' (Social Services) justification for continuing to use both the Statewide Fingerprint Imaging System (SFIS) and the Income Eligibility and Verification System (IEVS).

#### **Finding #1: Early fraud programs may not be cost-effective in all counties, but they are generally more cost-effective than ongoing investigations.**

Although they have taken some steps, neither the counties nor Social Services have conducted meaningful analyses to determine the cost-effectiveness of counties' efforts to detect and deter fraud in the CalWORKs and food stamp programs. As a result, we developed our own analysis, which indicates that the cost-effectiveness of antifraud efforts varies among the counties. Using a three-month projection of savings, our calculations showed that counties generally realize greater savings per dollar spent on early fraud activities than for ongoing investigations. This difference is due largely to the fact that according to the data that counties report, early fraud activities generally result in a much greater number of denials, discontinuances, and reductions of aid than ongoing investigations produce, and also because early fraud activities cost less. Ongoing investigations generally result in fewer discontinuances or reductions of aid because the main purpose of these investigations is to prove suspected fraud that may have occurred in the past.

Further, the net savings resulting from early fraud activities and ongoing investigations vary widely across the six counties we reviewed. For example, in the three-month projection for the food stamp program, Los Angeles County's early fraud activities yielded only 35 cents for every dollar it spent, while Orange County yielded \$1.82 in savings. Our calculations show similar variances among counties for the CalWORKs program. Differences in county practices may partially

#### **Audit Highlights . . .**

*Our review of the Department of Social Services' (Social Services) oversight of counties' antifraud efforts related to the California Work Opportunities and Responsibility to Kids (CalWORKs) program and the federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, known as the food stamp program in California, found the following:*

- » *Although they have taken some steps, neither the counties nor Social Services has performed any meaningful analyses to determine the cost-effectiveness of their efforts to detect and deter fraud in the CalWORKs or food stamp programs.*
- » *Our analysis of counties' investigative efforts found that the measurable savings resulting from early fraud activities exceed the costs for CalWORKs and approach cost neutrality for the food stamp program, assuming a three-month projection of savings.*
- » *Counties' early fraud efforts are more cost-effective than ongoing investigations.*
- » *Neither Social Services nor the six counties we visited took sufficient steps to ensure the accuracy of the data counties report on their investigation activities.*
- » *Social Services does not ensure that counties consistently follow up on information it provides them that might affect welfare recipients' eligibility.*
- » *Although Social Services asserts that the Statewide Fingerprint Imaging System (SFIS) deters welfare fraud, it has not assessed the cost-effectiveness of SFIS.*

account for variations in the cost-effectiveness of early fraud activities across the counties, to the extent that these practices affect the number of resulting denials, discontinuances, and reductions. For example, the counties that typically generated the highest measurable net savings in 2008—Orange and San Diego—not only accepted a high number of early fraud referrals but also had a high percentage of benefit denials, discontinuances, or reductions compared to their early fraud referrals.

Although neither Social Services nor the counties have performed a comprehensive analysis of the cost-effectiveness of the efforts to combat welfare fraud, some efforts have been made. One of the more promising efforts was the forming of a program integrity steering committee (steering committee) to follow up on the results of a 10-year statistical study on fraud prevention and detection activities in the CalWORKs and food stamp programs, and to identify cost-effective approaches for improving program integrity in both programs. In 2008 the steering committee approved eight recommendations for counties and 10 recommendations for Social Services regarding the most promising approaches it found. Social Services indicated that it is addressing four of the 10 recommendations directed to it and is considering how to address the remaining six.

We recommended that Social Services ensure that all counties consistently gauge the cost-effectiveness of their early fraud activities and ongoing investigation efforts for the CalWORKs and food stamp program by working with the counties to develop a formula to regularly perform a cost-effectiveness analysis using information that the counties currently submit. We also recommended that Social Services determine why some counties' efforts to combat welfare fraud are more cost-effective than others by using the results from the recommended cost-effectiveness analysis and that it seek to replicate the most cost-effective practices among all counties. Finally, we recommended that Social Services continue to address the recommendations of the steering committee and promptly act on the remaining recommendations.

#### ***Social Services' Action: Pending.***

In November 2009, Social Services released to the counties a formula for measuring the cost-effectiveness of their fraud efforts. Because this formula is dependent on county-reported data, Social Services is working to revise the investigation activity report and instructions, with a target completion in early 2011. To allow for the sharing of cost-effective practices among counties, Social Services indicates it will soon issue an all-county letter to direct counties to its publication of the "Promising Approaches and State Recommendations" on its Web site that was derived from the 10-year study. In spring 2011, Social Services plans to establish a Web page for counties to post and share information on improving program integrity and cost-effectiveness. Finally, to determine the cost-effectiveness of counties' fraud efforts, Social Services believes an automated system is needed to track and monitor metrics and outcomes. Because Social Services lacks the funding for this system, it plans to implement an interim process by mid-2011, as resources permit.

#### **Finding #2: Social Services does not ensure that counties report accurate data on their welfare fraud investigations.**

Neither Social Services nor the six counties we visited have taken sufficient steps to ensure the accuracy of the counties' data in their investigation activity reports. These reports, which counties submit monthly to Social Services, summarize the counties' fraud investigative efforts. We found that the information these counties included on the investigation activity report is not always accurate, supported, or reported consistently. Social Services is aware of problems with the data and has taken some limited steps to clarify the instructions for preparing these reports. However, Social Services has not taken steps to improve the accuracy of the counties' reporting and its procedures for reviewing investigation activity reports are inadequate to detect even the most glaring errors in the data that counties report. For example, although counties reported reducing benefits on a total of nearly 5,000 cases during fiscal year 2007–08 as a result of ongoing investigations, only 41 of those cases were reported by Los Angeles County, a number that seems quite low considering the county spent over \$23 million to perform ongoing investigations during 2008 and it represents 30 percent of the

State's CalWORKs caseload. In fact, Los Angeles County confirmed to us that it has been inadvertently underreporting the number of cases in this category. Despite the known problems with counties' reporting, Social Services uses these erroneous investigation activity reports to populate part of a report it submits to the federal government and to prepare reports submitted to internal decision makers and the Legislature.

To ensure the accuracy and consistency of the data counties submit on welfare fraud activities that counties report and that Social Services subsequently reports to other parties, we recommended that Social Services remind counties that they are responsible for reviewing the accuracy and consistency of investigation activity reports submitted, that it perform more diligent reviews of the accuracy of the counties' reports, provide counties with feedback on how to correct and prevent errors that it detects, and continue with its efforts to clarify the instructions for completing the investigation activity reports.

***Social Services' Action: Pending.***

Social Services is working to revise the investigation activity report and instructions, with a target completion in early 2011. Additionally, Social Services indicates once the instructions are revised, Social Services intends to provide technical assistance to the counties on how to complete the report accurately. Social Services further stated that it reviews the investigation activity reports during its county visits and discusses any inaccuracies it finds with county staff.

**Finding #3: Social Services does not ensure that counties consistently follow up on welfare fraud matches.**

Social Services does not ensure that counties consistently follow up on information it provides them that might affect welfare recipients' eligibility. Federal and state regulations require that Social Services distribute 10 lists of individuals' names that potentially could match certain criteria that would cause the individual's aid amounts to be reduced or make them ineligible for aid (match lists). Most of these lists are in paper form. For six of the 10 match lists, federal regulations mandate that the State must, within 45 days of receiving the match information, notify the welfare recipient of an intended action—a discontinuance of or reduction in benefits—or indicate that no action is required. For the remaining four match lists, there is no mandated time period for review. None of the counties we reviewed consistently followed up on all of the match lists that had to be completed within the 45-day timeline and only one county was consistently completing matches for the four match lists without a time requirement. According to representatives from the five counties we reviewed, the format of some match lists could be improved to make them more efficient to use. For example, all five counties told us that having all match lists in electronic form would allow them to process matches more efficiently. Social Services indicates it has attempted in the past to address counties' concerns with the format of the match lists and is taking steps to provide more lists in electronic form.

Although Social Services has a process in place to monitor the counties' efforts to follow up on match lists, it is missing opportunities to improve their efforts because it does not visit all counties on a regular basis and does not always enforce recommendations from these reviews. Specifically, Social Services has not reviewed 25 of the 58 counties during the three-year period from August 2006 to August 2009, including Los Angeles County, which represents 30 percent of the State's CalWORKs caseload and was last reviewed in 2005. Social Services asserts that it lacks resources to review the counties' efforts on a regular basis.

We recommended that Social Services remind counties of their responsibility under the state regulations to follow up diligently on all match lists and work with counties to determine reasons why poor follow-up exists and address those reasons. We also recommended that Social Services revive its efforts to work with counties to address their concerns about match-list formats. Further,

we recommended that Social Services perform reviews of all counties regularly and better enforce the counties' implementation of its recommendations to correct any findings and verify implementation of the corrective action plans required.

***Social Services' Action: Pending.***

Social Services says it will issue a notice to counties in early 2011 to remind them of their obligation to consistently follow up on match lists. Social Services indicates that five of the 12 match lists are available in electronic format for 35 counties on the Interim Statewide Automated Welfare System, but that automating the other matches will be addressed as resources permit. Social Services indicates it is working to complete the IEVS reviews scheduled for fiscal year 2009–10. Social Services indicates that revisions to match list format and criteria will be worked on as resources permit.

**Finding #4: Social Services has not done a cost-benefit analysis of SFIS.**

Although Social Services asserts that SFIS deters individuals from fraudulently applying for aid in multiple counties, it has not done a cost-benefit analysis of SFIS because it believes there is no way to measure the deterrence effect of the system. When justifying the implementation of SFIS, Social Services did not conduct its own study; instead, it used the estimates from an evaluation Los Angeles County performed in 1997 to project statewide savings that would result from SFIS. However, in a report we issued in 2003, we concluded that Social Services' methodology of projecting statewide savings using Los Angeles County's estimated savings was flawed, especially in its assumption that the incidence of duplicate-aid fraud in Los Angeles County was representative of the incidence of this type of fraud statewide. Although studies that Social Services conducted in 2005 and 2009 concluded that SFIS identifies fraud that other eligibility determination procedures do not, these studies were of limited scope.

The large and ongoing historical backlog of SFIS results awaiting resolution by county staff raises questions of how counties are using SFIS in deterring fraud. As of July 31, 2009, there was a statewide backlog of more than 13,700 cases that were awaiting resolution by county staff for more than 60 days. Moreover, the number of duplicate-aid cases SFIS has detected is fairly low, given its cost. In 2008 Social Services data show that statewide the counties used SFIS to identify 54 cases of duplicate-aid fraud, and they have identified a total of 845 instances of fraud through SFIS since its implementation in 2000. Social Services believes that SFIS does not identify many cases because it deters people from applying for duplicate aid, a benefit that it asserts cannot be measured. We acknowledge that fraud deterrence is difficult to measure. However, because the State is spending approximately \$5 million per year to maintain SFIS, Social Services has an obligation to justify whether the continued use of SFIS is cost-beneficial to the State. Further, we noted that Arizona has developed a process to conduct a yearly cost-benefit analysis of its fingerprint imaging system.

Recognizing that the deterrence effect is difficult to measure, we recommended that Social Services develop a method that allows it to gauge the cost-effectiveness of SFIS. Social Services should include in its efforts to measure cost-effectiveness the administrative cost that counties incur for using SFIS. Based on its results, Social Services should determine whether the continued use of SFIS is justified.

***Social Services' Action: None.***

- ➔ Social Services believes that a new independent cost-benefit analysis of SFIS would not be beneficial because it believes that the studies it has conducted, including the original evaluation it performed in 1997, which we concluded was flawed, justifies the deterrence value of SFIS.

**Finding #5: Social Services has not taken the necessary steps to claim its share of \$42.1 million in food stamp overpayment collections.**

Since December 2003 counties have received \$42.1 million in overpayments recovered from food stamp recipients. However, Social Services has been delayed in taking the steps needed to claim its share of these overpayments or to distribute the shares of these funds due to counties and the administering federal agency, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Overpayments to food stamp recipients can result from administrative errors by counties or inadvertent errors or fraud by recipients. Counties collect the overpayments from recipients through various means, including tax refunds intercepted and held by the federal government. For the distribution of overpayments to occur, Social Services must work with the USDA to reconcile tax intercepts and county collections, but it noted that its efforts have been delayed by staff turnover and past errors in counties' collection reports. Social Services' records show that of the \$42.1 million balance, \$17.2 million would go to the USDA, with the remaining \$24.9 million split between Social Services and the counties. The counties we reviewed deposit the cash they collect in their bank accounts and receive the interest earnings on these collections until Social Services claims its and the federal government's share. As a result of the six-year delay in addressing this issue, we estimate that Social Services lost approximately \$1.1 million in interest earnings on its share of the funds.

We recommended that Social Services continue to work with the USDA and make its reconciliation of the backlog of overpayments a priority to expedite the distribution of the \$42.1 million in food stamp overpayment collections to the appropriate entities. Further, it should develop procedures to ensure that it promptly reconciles future overpayments. Additionally, Social Services should continue to monitor the counties' collection reports to ensure that counties are reporting accurate information.

***Social Services' Action: Partial corrective action taken.***

Social Services indicates that as of June 2010 all overpayment collections were recovered. The total overpayment collections changed from \$42.1 million to \$39.8 million due to adjustments and revisions. As for the interest that counties earned while holding these funds, Social Services indicated it collected and forwarded \$465,000 to the federal government and that it is working with counties to collect the remaining interest earnings. Social Services also reports implementing a process to ensure the quarterly reconciliations are done timely and accurately. Finally, during the IEVS reviews, Social Services indicates staff are reviewing the accuracy of counties' collection reports.

**Finding #6: Investigation and prosecution efforts vary by county.**

County size, demographics, and county department staffing necessitate different approaches to investigating and prosecuting welfare fraud. Although the counties appear to have similar criteria for investigations, their procedures for conducting investigations and their criteria for prosecution and imposing administrative sanctions vary. For example, the monetary thresholds below which the district attorney generally does not prosecute fraud varied among the counties we visited and were as high as \$10,000, depending on the type of offense. These variances may affect the number of cases referred and successfully prosecuted in each county. The data reported by counties statewide show variances in the number of referrals for prosecution of CalWORKs and food stamp fraud and in the outcomes of the prosecutions filed. It is in the best interest of Social Services to track these variances, as well as study the counties' prosecution practices to determine whether other counties could become more effective in their efforts by emulating the successful prosecution practices used elsewhere.

Finally, state regulations require counties to conduct administrative disqualification hearings for CalWORKs and food stamp fraud cases for which the facts do not warrant prosecution or cases that have been referred for prosecution and subsequently declined. However, many counties have stopped using the administrative disqualification hearing process, which Social Services attributes to county investigative staff believing that the administrative disqualification hearing standard of proof is higher than in criminal cases. Social Services told us that it has convened a workgroup with the State's

presiding administrative law judge to discuss county concerns and clarify the appropriate application of the administrative hearing process. Social Services plans to issue guidance to counties when the workgroup has completed its efforts.

We recommended that Social Services track how counties determine prosecution thresholds for welfare fraud cases and determine the effects of these thresholds on counties' decisions to investigate potential fraud, with a focus on determining best practices and cost-effective methods. We also recommended that Social Services either ensure that counties follow state regulations regarding the use of administrative disqualification hearings or pursue changing the regulations.

***Social Services' Action: Pending.***

Social Services did not address our recommendation to review the effect of counties' varying prosecution thresholds. Social Services indicates continuing to work on notices to remind the counties of their responsibility to use the administrative disqualification hearing process and to convene a workgroup on this issue. However, due to limited resources, Social Services reports these efforts have been delayed until mid-2011. Social Services reports taking no action on our recommendation to track and review the cost-effectiveness of the prosecution levels that counties use.