Terrorism Readiness:
The Office of Homeland Security, Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, and California National Guard Need to Improve Their Readiness to Address Terrorism
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July 31, 2003

The Governor of California
President pro Tempore of the Senate
Speaker of the Assembly
State Capitol
Sacramento, California  95814

Dear Governor and Legislative Leaders:

As requested by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee, the Bureau of State Audits presents its audit report concerning the readiness of the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) and the California National Guard (National Guard) to respond to terrorist events in the State. This report concludes that although both agencies have developed plans that adequately guide their response to terrorist events, OES has not included a prevention element in the State’s terrorism response plan. Additionally, OES does not always identify the critical training that staff in the operations centers need to effectively complete their duties, nor does it regularly develop and administer state-level terrorism readiness exercises with other state and local agencies as required by the terrorism response plan. Furthermore, clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the State’s Office of Homeland Security and OES would be beneficial to ensure that clear lines of authority exist.

This report also concludes that although the National Guard generally relies on its members’ military training to respond to terrorism missions, it has not provided all of the training its staff in its Joint Operations Center needs to adequately respond to these missions. The National Guard also has not fully implemented a required terrorism readiness force protection program in its Army Guard Division. Additionally, although it conducts internal terrorism readiness exercises, the National Guard believes it has not had sufficient funding to participate in exercises involving other state and local emergency response agencies. Finally, despite ranking behind many of its counterparts in other states based on a key measure of recruiting and retention success, the National Guard has managed to finish near its end-strength goal—the number of members for which the National Guard is funded—for each of the last four years.

Respectfully submitted,

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SUMMARY

Audit Highlights . . .

Our review of the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services’ (OES) and the California National Guard’s (National Guard) terrorism readiness activities revealed:

✓ Both agencies have developed plans that adequately guide their response to terrorist events, but OES has not included a prevention element in the State’s terrorism response plan.

✓ OES has not always identified the critical training that staff in the operations centers need to effectively complete their duties.

✓ OES does not regularly develop and administer state-level terrorism readiness exercises with other state and local agencies, as its terrorism response plan requires.

✓ Clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the State’s Office of Homeland Security and OES would be beneficial.

✓ Although the National Guard generally relies on its members’ military training to respond to terrorism missions, it has not provided all of the training its staff in its Joint Operations Center needs to adequately respond to these missions.

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RESULTS IN BRIEF

The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) has developed a State Emergency Plan (emergency plan) that establishes a system for all phases of emergency management within the State and covers all emergencies that the State may encounter, including terrorist events. An annex to the emergency plan, called the terrorism response plan, describes how the State will respond to terrorist events and identifies the roles and responsibilities of 25 state agencies participating in the State’s responses.

Not included in either the emergency plan or the terrorism response plan are ways the State might help prevent terrorist events. Rather, the plans focus on how the State will respond when a terrorist event occurs. Although this focus is consistent with the role established for OES in the California Emergency Services Act (act), the recently developed National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for states to develop their abilities to help prevent terrorist events from occurring. The director of the State’s new Office of Homeland Security (OHS) advised us that his office recognizes the need for a prevention element in the terrorism response plan and intends to develop a state plan on terrorism that incorporates such an element.

As part of the emergency plan, OES is responsible for coordinating the State’s response to terrorism, which it does through its state operations center (state center) and its regional emergency operations centers (regional centers). However, OES has not always identified the critical training that staff in the state and regional centers need to effectively complete their duties. Without an assessment of the training needs of its staff, OES is not in a position to ensure that all state and regional centers’ staff are properly trained. According to OES, it lacks the funding to develop and implement training requirements for its staff. Additionally, although OES staff receive on-the-job experience, OES does not regularly develop and administer state-level terrorism readiness exercises with other state and local agencies, as the terrorism response plan requires. OES again cites a lack of funding as the reason it has not conducted these exercises. However, since February 2003, OES reports to the Governor’s Office through the OHS director, who told us that he believes
OES is adequately funded. He stated further that his office plans to perform a thorough assessment of the organization of OES to identify ways it can fulfill its statutory responsibilities more efficiently. In June 2003, OHS decided that the California National Guard (National Guard) should be responsible for coordinating state-level exercises and allocated federal funding for that purpose. Because of the unique role OES plays in coordinating emergencies, it will be important for OES to work with the National Guard to establish an effective exercise program. Without periodic training exercises, OES cannot ensure that state and local agencies are adequately prepared to respond to terrorism activities that occur within the State.

Clarification of the roles and responsibilities of OHS and OES would be beneficial. The authority provided to OES under the act and the authority provided to OHS by the governor's February 2003 executive order appear to have the potential to overlap. Moreover, the directors of the two offices appear to have differing views on their roles and responsibilities. A lack of clarity in their respective roles and responsibilities could adversely affect the State's ability to respond to emergencies, such as a terrorist event.

As one of the state agencies OES can call on in an emergency, the National Guard has developed an overall strategy as well as specific plans and procedures to outline its role in the State's response to terrorist events and identify the actions essential to its being prepared for its likely missions. Although the National Guard has begun working toward completing several of the objectives of its overall strategy, it has many left to accomplish. The National Guard told us that the primary reason for it not yet attaining all the objectives of its overall strategy is that many of the actions require the participation of bodies outside the National Guard, such as the state Legislature and the U.S. Congress. Therefore, it has not yet fully accomplished many of the key actions.

Additionally, most of the training performed by the National Guard is federally funded and designed to prepare the organization to meet its federal military missions. Although these federal missions are not specifically terrorism readiness, the skills possessed by the National Guard forces can be used by the State to respond to terrorist events occurring within the State. The National Guard’s Joint Operations Center is responsible for receiving requests for state missions from OES and developing and overseeing the National Guard’s response to the requests. The Joint Operations Center has identified key training its staff need to effectively coordinate missions.
and perform the functions of the Joint Operations Center; however, many of the 38 staff have not received even half of this training. According to the deputy director of the Joint Operations Center, lack of funding and limited availability of classes have hindered its ability to train its Joint Operations Center staff in the areas identified. Without proper training, the ability of the National Guard to respond promptly and effectively to state missions may deteriorate.

Training is also lacking in the National Guard’s Army Guard Division—specifically, training in its terrorism readiness force protection program, designed to protect National Guard units against terrorist threats. According to the commanders of the Army Guard units we visited, training is not being provided because they have not received the guidance from National Guard management on implementing the terrorism readiness force protection training. Without the required terrorism readiness training, National Guard troops are less prepared for terrorist threats. Furthermore, although the National Guard performs regular exercises to prepare its response to state missions, including terrorism, the National Guard believes it has not had sufficient funding to participate in exercises involving other state and local emergency response agencies. As discussed previously, OHS has now allocated federal funds to the National Guard to coordinate state-level exercises.

Finally, although an analysis focusing on a key measure of recruiting and retention success indicates that the efforts of California’s National Guard have not been as successful as National Guard forces in many other states and territories, it has managed to finish near its end-strength goal—that is, the number of members for which the National Guard is funded—for each of the last four years. Further, its ranking among states and territories in recruiting and retention does not have a direct correlation to its readiness to respond to its missions, including responding to terrorist events. However, federal deployments of National Guard units do affect the availability of the units to respond to state missions. Because the military missions assigned to the National Guard by the Department of Defense are its primary missions, National Guard units activated by the federal government are not available to respond to state missions. OES advised us that if National Guard forces are deployed, OES can access resources through other agencies as needed. Nonetheless, OES stated that although some capabilities of the National Guard can be replaced by other agencies, the National Guard plays a critical role in supporting requests for specialized equipment.
RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure that the State is adequately prepared to address terrorist threats, OHS should do the following:

• Continue its plans to develop a state plan on terrorism that includes a prevention element.

• Continue its plans to thoroughly assess OES functions to determine how it can optimize its efficiency.

• Work with the governor on how best to clarify the roles and responsibilities of OHS and OES.

To ensure that state agencies, including OES, are adequately prepared to respond to terrorist events occurring within the State, OES should do the following:

• Identify the most critical training required by staff at the state and regional centers and then allocate existing funding or seek additional funding it needs to deliver the training.

• Assist the National Guard in providing state-level terrorism readiness exercises.

To ensure that its members are adequately trained to respond to terrorism, the National Guard should do the following:

• Determine the most critical training its Joint Operations Center staff need to fulfill their duties and then allocate existing funding or seek the needed funding to provide the training, documenting why it is needed.

• Develop guidance for its Army Guard Division to implement its terrorism readiness force protection program.

• Use the recently awarded funds from OHS to identify the type and frequency of state-level exercises responding to terrorist events that the State needs to be adequately prepared. The National Guard should then provide the exercises it has identified.

AGENCY COMMENTS

OHS and OES agree with the recommendations directed to each of them. The Military Department, which is composed mainly of the National Guard, acknowledges that our report identifies
areas where it can improve its support to the State, and its response describes actions it is taking for each recommendation directed to it.
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VARIOUS STATE AGENCIES HAVE ROLES IN TERRORISM READINESS

The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) is responsible for coordinating the State’s response to all emergencies, including terrorist events. Additionally, OES has identified 25 state agencies that play lead or supporting roles in responding to terrorism. One of these state agencies is the Military Department, which provides support in a variety of areas and consists primarily of the California National Guard (National Guard). In February 2003, the governor created the State’s Office of Homeland Security (OHS) to coordinate and approve all terrorism-related activities in the State. Additionally, OES is to report to the Governor’s Office through the OHS director.

Office of Emergency Services

The California Emergency Services Act (act) established OES and gave its director the responsibility of coordinating the activities of all state agencies in responding to emergencies within the State. In fulfilling the requirements of the act, OES is responsible for ensuring the State’s readiness to respond to and recover from natural, man-made, and war-caused emergencies. OES is also responsible for assisting local governments in their emergency preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. Accordingly, OES developed a State Emergency Plan (emergency plan), which establishes a system for coordinating all phases of emergency management in California. Additionally, OES developed an annex to the emergency plan that specifically addresses terrorism (terrorism response plan). The terrorism response plan provides direction to state agencies and local governments within California involved in protecting public safety and preparing for and responding to terrorist events.

OES operates a warning center staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. County emergency services offices contact this center when an emergency arises. The act provides that during a state of war emergency, a state of emergency, or a local emergency, the director of OES will coordinate the emergency activities of all state agencies connected with the emergency, and every state agency and officer will cooperate with the director in rendering
all possible assistance in carrying out the provisions of the act. During an emergency, OES activates its state operations center (state center) in Sacramento and its three regional emergency operations centers (regional centers) in affected areas to receive and process local requests for assistance.

Although OES does maintain some emergency response resources—communications vans and portable satellite units to establish voice and data transmissions from remote locations, for instance—its main role is to plan for and coordinate responses to disasters that occur within the State, including directing the resources of other state agencies that may be needed in times of emergency.

The act gives the governor broad powers in carrying out emergency response responsibilities. The governor has subsequently delegated much of the authority to OES. The act allows the governor to spend any appropriation needed to support executing the responsibilities of the act. Further, the act allows that during a state of emergency, the governor may direct all agencies of the state government to utilize and employ state personnel, equipment, and facilities for the performance of any and all activities designed to help prevent or alleviate actual and threatened damage due to the emergency.

In 1999, the governor created the State Strategic Committee on Terrorism (committee on terrorism), chaired by the OES director, to guide the State in its preparedness for and response to terrorism. After the events of September 11, 2001, the committee on terrorism was specifically charged with evaluating the potential threat of terrorist attacks in the State, reviewing California’s current state of readiness to help prevent and respond to a potential attack, and establishing and prioritizing recommendations for prevention and response. In performing these tasks, the committee on terrorism was to consider how the resources of both the public and private sectors could be used in combating terrorism.

To carry out this work, the committee on terrorism established numerous subject matter and support subcommittees, including one that addressed the training needs of emergency responders and another that identified potential sources of funding.

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**Conditions or Degrees of Emergency Defined by the California Emergency Services Act**

**State of war emergency** means the condition that exists immediately, even without being formally proclaimed by the governor, whenever the State or nation is attacked by an enemy of the United States, or upon receipt by the State of a warning from the federal government indicating that such an enemy attack is probable or imminent.

**State of emergency** means the duly appointed authority has proclaimed the existence of conditions of disaster or extreme peril to the safety of persons and property within the State that, by reason of their magnitude, are or are likely to be beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat. Includes conditions such as fire, flood, storm, riot, sudden and severe energy shortage, and earthquake.

**Local emergency** means the duly appointed authority has proclaimed the existence of conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property within the territorial limits of a county, city, and county, or city that are likely to be beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of that political subdivision and require the combined forces of other political subdivisions to combat. Includes conditions similar to those in a state of emergency.
Additionally, within the committee on terrorism is the State Threat Advisory Committee, which was established to provide an ongoing capability for rapid assessment of information regarding the potential effects of specific terrorists’ threats or events in California. In February 2003, the governor established the director of OHS as the chair of the committee on terrorism, replacing the director of OES in that role.

**California National Guard**

OES has identified 25 state agencies that have roles in responding to terrorism. One state agency that provides support in a variety of areas is the Military Department, which is composed mainly of the National Guard. The mission of the National Guard is threefold: to provide mission-ready forces to the federal government as directed by the president, to provide emergency military support to civil authorities as directed by the governor, and to provide support to the community as approved by the proper authority. The state adjutant general, who is appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state Senate, commands the National Guard. Although its federal mission is its first priority, when the federal government is not using the National Guard’s resources, they are available for the State to use.

As shown in Figure 1 on the following page, the National Guard comprises three divisions: Joint Staff, Army Guard, and Air Guard.

The Joint Staff Division is organized into four teams: operations, resource management, special staff, and services and support. The twofold mission of the Joint Staff Division is to provide direct service and support to a wide base of public agencies and to develop, implement, and provide timely policies, procedures, and support to the Army Guard and Air Guard divisions. Included in the Joint Staff Division is the Joint Operations Center, which coordinates the National Guard’s response to state missions.

The Army Guard Division comprises a headquarters command and two senior commands: the 40th Mechanized Infantry Division and the 49th Combat Support Command. The senior

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**Resources the State Strategic Committee on Terrorism Was to Consider in Developing the State’s Preparedness for and Response to Terrorism**

- Public and private infrastructures that support the people and economy of California.
- Facilities and systems for manufacturing, processing, transporting, disposing of, and storing potentially dangerous substances.
- Farms, ranches, feeding, processing, storage, delivery, and other systems that are part of the agricultural industry.
- Railways, bridges, roadways, terminals, ports, and other transportation arteries.
- Hospitals, emergency medical systems, and other health facilities and systems critical to the State’s ability to rescue and administer to those who may be affected by terrorist acts.
- Computers, computer networks, and other computing systems that provide essential data processing, system control, and information channels.
- Procedures of agencies and departments responsible for issuing licenses and/or regulating materials or processes that pose a potential terrorist threat.
- Public employees, facilities, and systems that provide the services necessary for protection of the State.
commands include capabilities such as engineering, military intelligence, field artillery, and infantry. As of September 2002, the Army Guard Division had approximately 16,100 soldiers assigned. The Army Guard Division also oversees the California State Military Reserve, which is composed of unpaid volunteers.

The Air Guard Division consists of a combat communications group and four flying wings: a rescue wing, a fighter wing, an airlift wing, and an air refueling wing. These units include capabilities such as fighter interceptor forces, air rescue and recovery, aerial refueling, communications, civil engineering, and medical care. As of September 2002, the Air Guard Division had almost 4,900 personnel assigned.

When OES calls on the National Guard to respond to a state mission—which the National Guard refers to as Military Support to Civil Authorities—the National Guard develops a task force to respond to the mission. To form the task force, the National Guard’s Joint Operations Center assigns needed personnel and assets from the various units within the Army Guard and Air Guard divisions. Therefore, when the National Guard responds to a state mission, it normally does not need to activate all the resources of one unit.
Office of Homeland Security

In February 2003, the governor through an executive order established OHS within the Governor's Office. Under the executive order, the director of OHS, along with any staff, is appointed by the governor. The mission of OHS includes developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy to coordinate security activities throughout the State. Further, the director of OHS is responsible for coordinating the security efforts of all departments and agencies in the State. The director is also the chair of both the committee on terrorism and the Emergency Response Training Advisory Committee. The executive order directs OES and the Office of Criminal Justice Planning to report to the Governor's Office through the OHS director and assigns the following responsibilities to OHS:

- Coordinating and approving all activities between state and federal agencies on topics related to terrorism, including coordinating and approving all state requests for federal funds designated for activities related to addressing terrorism, developing guidelines for all such state requests, and approving the distribution of any federal funds allocated to the State.

- Serving as the principal point of contact for and to the governor with respect to the federal Department of Homeland Security and all other federal and state agencies and legislators on matters relating to terrorism and state security.

- Coordinating the review and assessment of the emergency plan and the terrorism response plan, and coordinating the amendment and the submission of those plans, through the California Emergency Council, to the governor for approval.

- Assigning specific state security functions to state agencies consistent with the duties and responsibilities identified in the emergency plan and the terrorism response plan.

- Coordinating efforts to ensure that all state departments and agencies that have intelligence collection responsibilities have sufficient technological capabilities and resources to collect intelligence and data relating to terrorist activities or possible terrorist events within California.
THE EMERGENCY PLAN ESTABLISHES A SYSTEM FOR COORDINATING ALL PHASES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA

The act calls for the development of emergency plans to describe the principles and methods to be applied in carrying out emergency operations during emergencies. Accordingly, OES has prepared the emergency plan, which establishes a system for coordinating all phases of emergency management in California. The act requires OES to create a standardized system for all emergency response agencies to use in managing emergencies. Thus, OES developed the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) to provide a framework for managing multiagency and multijurisdictional emergencies in California.

As shown in Figure 2, the SEMS provides for five organizational levels, which are activated as needed in response to an emergency. The five SEMS organizational levels combined with private sector resources are collectively referred to as the California Emergency Organization, which we discuss further in Appendix A. According to the emergency plan, the SEMS helps bring all elements of the California Emergency Organization together into a single integrated system. The act requires all state response agencies to use the SEMS, and local government agencies are required to use the SEMS to be eligible for state emergency response funding.

The SEMS incorporates the use of the incident command system, which provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual agencies as they work toward the common goal of stabilizing an incident and protecting life, property, and the environment. As a means of coordinating the effective use of all available resources, the incident command system is built around five major functions: management, planning, operations, logistics, and finance and administration. These functions are the foundation on which the response organization develops. Accordingly, emergency response agencies at each level of the SEMS are organized into the five functional areas, which apply during a routine emergency, when preparing for a major event, or when managing a response to a major disaster.
Resource requests for response and recovery operations originate at the lowest level of the SEMS and are progressively forwarded to the next level until filled. For example, if an operational area is unable to provide the necessary requested assistance, it may contact the appropriate OES regional center and forward the request. California has established essential communication support procedures among the operational areas, the OES state and regional centers, and other state agencies to provide the information links for the elements of the California Emergency Organization.

The terrorism response plan incorporates the use of the SEMS in responding to terrorist events, consistent with the emergency plan. Accordingly, it describes how local and state agencies will interact during an emergency. It also describes how OES will respond to terrorist threats. Finally, it identifies the roles and responsibilities of state agencies that are likely to be called on in responding to terrorist events. Table A.2 in Appendix A summarizes the roles and responsibilities of state agencies as presented in the terrorism response plan.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The Joint Legislative Audit Committee (audit committee) requested that the Bureau of State Audits conduct an audit of the terrorism readiness efforts of OES and the National Guard. Specifically, the audit committee asked that we review and evaluate the terrorism prevention and response plans, policies, and procedures of these agencies and determine whether the plans are periodically updated and contain sufficient guidance. It also asked that we determine whether OES and the National Guard have provided sufficient training to their staff to effectively respond to terrorism activities and assess how the training compares to best practices or other reasonable approaches. The audit committee further requested that we determine whether both agencies take advantage of all state and federal funding for terrorism readiness. Finally, the audit committee asked that we determine whether the National Guard's recruitment and retention practices and staffing levels impact its readiness to respond to terrorism activities or its ability to attract qualified personnel for terrorism readiness positions.

Subsequent to the audit committee's approval of this audit, the governor established OHS in February 2003. The governor charged OHS with leading the State's efforts regarding terrorism and directed OES to report to the Governor's Office through the OHS director. Accordingly, we interviewed the OHS director to gain an understanding of his plans for guiding the State's terrorism readiness efforts and how the role of OES and other state agencies may be affected by those plans.

To evaluate the terrorism readiness plans, policies, and procedures, we reviewed and analyzed the relevant laws, rules, and regulations. Additionally, we reviewed the documents that OES and the National Guard had prepared related to terrorism prevention and response. We determined whether the documents appeared reasonable, providing appropriate detail and instruction to enable a sufficient response. We interviewed staff at both OES and the National Guard to determine whether they had established a process to periodically review the plans and update them as necessary.

To evaluate the training OES and the National Guard provided, we identified the key individuals within each organization that would be involved in responding to a terrorist event. At OES, we determined that these individuals worked in its state and regional centers. At the National Guard, the key individuals
were in the Joint Operations Center. We ascertained whether both agencies had identified the training these key employees need to effectively complete their responsibilities. For the training needs we identified, we determined whether the relevant individuals had received the training.

The federal government requires the National Guard to provide certain training to its members. To determine whether the National Guard had provided this training to its members, we visited four units—two from the Army Guard Division and two from the Air Guard Division—and obtained information from a third Army Guard unit. When records existed, we reviewed the training records of 15 members at each unit. We also visited the National Guard’s two civil support teams to determine if their members had received required training. To determine the training that OES provides through its California Specialized Training Institute, we reviewed its catalog of courses and interviewed the director of the institute.

To understand the extent to which the committee on terrorism had identified training needs and opportunities for state-level terrorism readiness personnel, we reviewed documents prepared by the committee on terrorism.

To determine whether OES and the National Guard take advantage of all state and federal terrorism readiness funds, we identified the amount each agency received in funds specifically earmarked for terrorism readiness activities and then determined if the agencies used the funds. We also inquired about the methods the agencies use to identify potential sources of funding to determine if the methods were reasonable and whether the agencies saw gaps in existing funding for terrorism readiness programs.

To identify best practices for planning, training, and funding, we reviewed the National Strategy for Homeland Security created by the federal government and obtained information from other states. Although we contacted some of the same states to identify best practices for OES and the National Guard, we performed independent analyses to determine which states should be included in the respective reviews. To compare other states’ practices with those of OES, we selected its counterparts in Florida, Georgia, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. New York declined to provide any information, and Pennsylvania declined to provide its terrorism response plan. For our comparison to the National Guard, we selected Florida, Michigan, New York, Texas, and Washington. The Washington
National Guard declined to provide its terrorism readiness plan for our review, although it did provide information related to its terrorism readiness activities.

To determine whether the National Guard’s recruitment and retention practices and staffing levels affect its readiness to respond to terrorism activities, we interviewed key staff in the Air Guard and Army Guard divisions to understand how the National Guard measures its mission readiness. To determine the National Guard’s recruiting and retention effectiveness, we analyzed recruiting and retention data as of September 2002 provided by the federal National Guard Bureau for the 54 state and territorial National Guards and determined how California compared.
CHAPTER 1

A More Comprehensive Plan and Improved Training Could Enhance the State’s Ability to Prevent and Respond to Terrorism

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) has developed a State Emergency Plan (emergency plan) that establishes a system for all phases of emergency management within the State and covers all emergencies that the State may encounter, including terrorist events. Terrorism is specifically addressed in the terrorism response plan—an annex to the emergency plan. However, the terrorism response plan focuses solely on how the State will respond when a terrorist event occurs, not on how the State could help prevent terrorist events. Although this focus is consistent with the role established for OES in the California Emergency Services Act (act), recent events have established the need for prevention as well as response efforts to protect California citizens from terrorism. Recognizing this need, the director of the State’s new Office of Homeland Security (OHS) informed us that OHS intends to develop a state plan that will include a prevention component. Additionally, OES lacks a formal process to periodically review its terrorism response plan based on specified criteria and update the plan accordingly to ensure that the plan remains current.

As part of the emergency plan, OES is responsible for coordinating the State’s response to terrorism, which it does through its state operations center (state center) and regional emergency operations centers (regional centers). However, OES has not identified the critical training that staff at the state and regional centers need to effectively complete their duties. Without an assessment of the training needs of its staff, OES is not in a position to ensure that all its staff are properly trained. According to OES, it lacks the funding to develop and implement training requirements for its staff. Additionally, although OES staff receive on-the-job experience, OES does not regularly coordinate state-level terrorism readiness exercises with other state and local agencies as called for in the terrorism response plan. OES again cites inadequate funding as the primary factor hindering it from conducting these exercises.
Recognizing the importance of periodic training exercises, OHS decided in June 2003 that the California National Guard (National Guard) should be responsible for coordinating state-level exercises and allocated federal funding for that purpose. However, because of the unique role that OES plays in coordinating emergencies and ensuring that state and local agencies are adequately prepared to respond to terrorism activities that occur within the State, OES should work with the National Guard to establish an effective exercise program.

Finally, clarification of the roles and responsibilities of OHS and OES would be beneficial. The authority provided to OES under the act and the authority provided to OHS by the governor's February 2003 executive order appear to have the potential to overlap. Further, the directors of the two offices appear to have differing views on their roles and responsibilities. A lack of clarity in their respective roles and responsibilities could adversely affect the State's ability to respond to emergencies, such as a terrorist event.

**THE TERRORISM RESPONSE PLAN GUIDES THE STATE’S RESPONSE BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE WAYS TO HELP PREVENT TERRORISM**

Although the emergency plan and terrorism response plan adequately define the roles and responsibilities of numerous state and local agencies in responding to various emergencies, including terrorism, they do not address how the State could help prevent terrorist attacks from occurring. In accordance with the act, OES focuses on coordinating the State’s response to emergencies and has integrated the use of the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) into the emergency plan as required by state law. However, prevention is the number one priority identified in the National Strategy for Homeland Security (national strategy) developed by the federal government. The director of California’s newly established OHS advised us that his office is aware of the need for the State to include the prevention of terrorist events in a state plan. Accordingly, OHS will soon be developing a state plan that will include this element. Another aspect of planning that needs improvement is plan review and revision. OES has not established a formal process to regularly review and update its terrorism response plan and thus cannot ensure that the plan remains current and adequately protects the State.
The act establishes the requirement for an emergency plan and declares that it must be in effect in each political subdivision of the State. The act also requires the governing body of each political subdivision of the State to carry out the provisions of the emergency plan. OES is responsible for maintaining the emergency plan and for assisting local governments and other state agencies in developing their own emergency plans. OES’s emergency plan and its annexes, including the terrorism response plan, provide the framework for the State’s response to all types of emergencies and establish the systems and functions that state agencies must use in responding to emergencies. Taken together, these plans appear to provide adequate guidance for responding to an act of terrorism. OES’s terrorism response plan is also comparable to the terrorism plans of three other states we reviewed. In fact, one state told us that it had modeled its plan, which is still being finalized, after California’s because it viewed California as a leader in emergency response planning. Additional details on OES’s plans appear in Appendix A.

**The Terrorism Response Plan Does Not Address Prevention**

Lacking in the terrorism response plan is guidance for terrorism prevention. One reason for this deficiency may be that the Legislature did not envision a prevention role when it established OES in the act. Rather, the act sets the focus of OES as coordinating the State’s response activities. However, the State needs to plan how it can help prevent terrorist events from occurring to best protect the citizens of the State against the consequences of such events. The State does have some activities designed to help prevent terrorist activities: The California Anti-Terrorism Information Center provides intelligence support to statewide law enforcement to combat terrorism, and law enforcement has historically worked to help prevent acts such as terrorism. Nonetheless, including these activities and any other relevant activities in a state plan would help ensure that state and local resources are used most effectively.

Acknowledging this void in the current terrorism response plan, the director of the newly created OHS stated that his office plans to revise the current state plan to make it more concise and include a prevention component. The director explained that although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the overall responsibility for terrorism prevention, the duties of analyzing and disseminating intelligence information to local law enforcement and the FBI belong to the State. Including a prevention element in the state plan is important to ensure that...
a process is in place to analyze and disseminate intelligence information. The OHS director added that the efficient and effective use of state resources requires coordination and cooperation at all levels, and the gathering of intelligence and its lawful dissemination to all concerned parties is a pivotal and important state role.

The OHS director said that he expects a new state plan that includes a prevention element will be released in fiscal year 2003–04. The plan that OHS intends to develop will define the roles of state agencies involved in terrorism prevention. The OHS director stated that OES likely would play a role in the prevention element. However, he also said that other agencies would have significant responsibilities in helping to prevent future terrorist attacks, and OHS would coordinate these resources. For example, he told us that he envisions the role of the National Guard evolving from assisting in managing the consequences of a terrorist attack to using its expertise in intelligence analysis, planning, and training.

Including a terrorism prevention element in the state plan is consistent with the direction from the national strategy developed by the federal government. The national strategy puts the highest priority on the objective of preventing terrorist attacks within the United States. Another primary mission identified by the national strategy is protecting critical infrastructures and key assets by preventing, to the extent possible, the possibility of terrorist attacks. As part of a national vision, the national strategy specifies that the collection and analysis of homeland security intelligence and information is a priority of the highest measure. This national vision further states that efforts must be structured to provide all pertinent homeland security intelligence and law enforcement information—from all relevant sectors, including state and local law enforcement as well as federal agencies—to those able to take preventive or protective action.

**OES Has No Formal Process to Periodically Review and Update the Terrorism Response Plan**

OES lacks a formal process to regularly review the terrorism response plan and update it as determined necessary. Without an established process to regularly review the plan, OES cannot

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1 For information regarding OES’s process for updating the State Emergency Plan, refer to audit report 2002-113, issued in July 2003.
ensure that it remains current and adequately protects the State. The terrorism response plan was last updated in February 2001. When we asked whether OES has a formal process to regularly review the terrorism response plan to determine if changes are needed, the director of the Planning and Technological Assistance Branch explained that although no formal process exists, the terrorism response plan is updated when changes in statute affecting emergency management or changes occur in regulations, policies, or significant procedures.

OES did review the terrorism response plan in March 2003 as part of a federal effort to ensure that state emergency plans were adequate. During this review, OES assessed the terrorism response plan and determined that no updates were necessary. To receive federal funding, OES needed to determine that existing plans were adequate and capable of guiding appropriate emergency response and recovery operations in the State. In fulfilling this obligation, OES used a checklist provided by the federal government that guided OES in reviewing key elements expected in a plan, including planning and functional responsibilities and capabilities such as communications, warnings, public education, protective actions, public health planning, health and medical coordination, and evaluating preparedness for radiological terrorist incidents.

Although OES has not established a formal process to regularly review the terrorism response plan, other organizations and states do regularly update and incorporate lessons learned into their plans. For example, the National Guard Bureau, the federal agency that oversees the National Guard in each state, requires all National Guard forces to evaluate their emergency plans annually and update them as determined necessary. Additionally, each of the four states we talked to requires its emergency services agency to regularly review its emergency plan and update it when the agency thinks it is needed. For example, Florida reviews its plan annually and updates it at least every two years.

OES would benefit from a process to regularly review its terrorism response plan to assess whether it is still meeting the needs of the State. Furthermore, OES would make its assessment more consistent and effective if it developed a checklist to guide its efforts in evaluating the terrorism response plan. OES could use the checklist provided by the federal government as part of its recent effort to review plans, modifying the checklist as it feels necessary to best meet the needs and special circumstances of each of the four states we talked to requires its emergency services agency to regularly review its emergency plan and update it when the agency thinks it is needed.
California as they relate to terrorism readiness. Although OES does have a checklist that its Planning and Technological Assistance Branch uses to review plans, the checklist is only one page and is not specific to terrorism, addressing issues such as the legal basis of the plan and whether it is consistent with the SEMS.

OES HAS NOT IDENTIFIED THE TRAINING NEEDS FOR ALL OF ITS STAFF

OES has not conducted a needs assessment to determine the training requirements for all personnel at its state and regional centers and to ensure that it spends its training funds most effectively. To determine whether OES adequately trains its staff in responding to terrorist events, we asked OES to show us the training courses that it considers essential for its staff to fulfill their responsibilities. We focused our assessment on the state center staff because the state center is the entity that coordinates the State’s response to emergencies such as a terrorist event. We also evaluated whether OES has developed training requirements for staff in the regional centers, because they are the OES employees who coordinate the response at the regional level.

According to a representative for the director’s office, OES acknowledges its need to identify critical training for its staff. For example, OES believes that its staff would probably benefit from additional terrorism awareness training. The representative states that OES would like to have a training program for all its staff but has not developed formal training requirements for personnel in its state and regional centers because it does not have the funding to pay for the training. The State Strategic Committee on Terrorism (committee on terrorism) also identified the need for additional training for OES staff. Specifically, it found that state emergency response personnel, including OES, needed more training in areas such as terrorism response operations, terrorism emergency management, and crisis and risk communications.

OES does not appear to be unique in not identifying the training needs of its emergency response staff. None of the four states we contacted had developed a formal training plan that identifies the training needed by staff responsible for coordinating state emergency response efforts. However, two of the four states we talked to said they were in the process of developing a plan that would identify training needs.
In fiscal year 1998–99, OES did create training guidelines for its emergency service coordinators (service coordinators); however, it never implemented these guidelines because it determined that service coordinators working in different functions within OES needed different training to fulfill their responsibilities. Additionally, OES has developed an individual training plan (training plan) program, which identifies an individual employee’s career goals and objectives, the knowledge required to meet those goals and objectives, and the training required to obtain the knowledge. However, OES had only developed training plans for seven of the 14 state center staff we reviewed. Further, OES has not developed guidance for all of its supervisors preparing training plans to ensure that they include training related to core competencies. Core competencies are the key skills employees need to possess to perform their assigned duties. Although the training plan could be a useful tool, because OES does not use it for all state center staff and does not provide guidance to all supervisors preparing training plans, OES cannot ensure that all state center staff receive the training they need to effectively respond to emergencies.

According to the director of the California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI)—the training arm of OES—OES is reviewing its training policy and is in the process of developing a formal training program that will include core competencies for all employees; however, there is no target date for this program to take effect. By not identifying the essential training its employees need, OES runs the risk of having staff members who are insufficiently trained to fulfill their responsibilities and perform their functions in the state and regional centers. If personnel are not well trained, their ability to effectively coordinate activities in response to emergencies could be hampered, which could lead to delayed response times to emergencies, including terrorist events. Additionally, OES cannot ensure that it spends its training funds most effectively.

Although OES has not identified what training is most important to personnel at its state and regional centers in fulfilling their responsibilities, it does provide a broad range of emergency management classes—including several related to terrorism—at its CSTI. Specifically, the CSTI offers 14 courses that specifically address terrorism, including the following:

- Terrorism I: Understanding the Threat
- Terrorism II: Meeting the Threat
The CSTI recommends some of these courses, such as Terrorism I, to all government agencies, including law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical services and health providers, emergency management agencies, and concerned entities from the private sector. Other courses, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction Technician/Specialist—Terrorism, are directed to a specialized group.

In June 2003, OHS allocated $2.4 million in federal funds to the National Guard to coordinate the design of a new terrorism readiness training curriculum for state and local emergency response agencies. According to a deputy director at OHS, the National Guard will develop and implement a terrorism readiness training program based on the recommendations of the Emergency Response Training Advisory Committee (training committee) for all appropriate agencies, including OES. The training committee was established by statute in September 2002 and is charged with developing specific training criteria related to terrorism. The training committee comprises representatives from state and local law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services, and port security.

OES HAS NOT CONDUCTED STATE-LEVEL TERRORISM READINESS EXERCISES AS CALLED FOR IN ITS TERRORISM RESPONSE PLAN

With the exception of federally or state mandated exercises associated with nuclear power plants and hospitals, the State does not presently have an established program to provide exercises to ensure that state agencies are prepared to respond to terrorist events. Even though the terrorism response plan states that OES must develop and administer exercises to test and enhance the capabilities of state agencies, local governments, and related entities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist events, OES has not developed and administered these exercises. According to a representative for the director’s office,
OES has not regularly developed and administered terrorism readiness exercises because it is not funded to do so. However, OES has not requested state funding to conduct the exercises. Further, OES has not identified the types and frequency of exercises needed to adequately prepare state and local agencies for terrorist events. If it were to have done so, and made a compelling argument as to why the exercises were needed, OES might have been more successful in obtaining the funding.

OES has participated in terrorism readiness exercises when other agencies have held them, and staff have received training through activation experiences. For example, the federal government contracted with the RAND Corporation to design and implement a terrorism readiness exercise in California in April 2003. OES hosted the exercise and assisted by inviting the appropriate state agencies to participate and by providing input on the exercise design. OES also was invited to participate in exercises held by various entities, such as Los Angeles County; the U.S. Coast Guard; and the National Guard’s civil support teams, which are responsible for responding to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents. In addition, as of March 2003, the state center has been activated 48 times in the past three fiscal years, including seven times for monitoring possible terrorist activities during times of heightened alert. For example, the state center was activated to monitor emergency situations during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the San Diego Super Bowl, and the Iraq war. Since the state center operates similarly when responding to all types of emergencies, these activations provide state center staff with the opportunity to use their skills. Therefore, while the state center has not regularly developed and administered terrorism readiness exercises, through the activations for other emergencies, state center staff are able to use and hone their skills in coordinating the response to emergencies.

However, these activities would not necessarily test and enhance the capabilities of state agencies, local governments, and related entities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist events as called for in the terrorism response plan. For this kind of training to be effective, all state agencies assigned a role in the terrorism response plan should be included, and the exercises should include scenarios needed to adequately train state agency staff in their designated roles. Providing terrorism readiness exercise opportunities to state agencies appears to be an area where California can learn from other states. Three of the four
states we talked to reported that they regularly provide terrorism readiness exercises to state emergency response agencies. Without periodic training exercises, OES cannot ensure that the state and local agencies are adequately prepared to respond to terrorism activities within the State.

Although its terrorism response plan calls for OES to develop and administer exercises to ensure that state agencies are prepared to respond to terrorist events, OHS has recently decided that another agency should be responsible for coordinating state-level exercises. As discussed later in the chapter, the State recently received federal funds it could use for exercises. OHS informed us that it was awarded $1.6 million in federal funds in May 2003, which it subsequently allocated to the National Guard to coordinate terrorism readiness exercises for the benefit of state agencies and rural jurisdictions. The $1.6 million represents the entire state agency portion of the exercise appropriation given to California. The State was awarded additional federal funds in June 2003, but OHS has not yet decided how much will be allocated to exercises. Nevertheless, the OHS director believes that federal funds will be sufficient at this time to provide the needed exercises and that no additional state funding will be required. No matter how much funding is allocated, because of the unique role that OES plays in coordinating emergencies, it will be important for OES to work with the National Guard to establish an effective exercise program.

OES RECEIVES BOTH FEDERAL AND STATE FUNDING FOR TERRORISM READINESS EQUIPMENT AND ACTIVITIES

For federal fiscal years 2000 through 2003, the State was awarded approximately $216 million in federal terrorism readiness funds, much of which was just received in May and June 2003. Although most of the federal funds are passed to local governments to operate their terrorism readiness programs, approximately $39 million is available for state-level terrorism readiness efforts. Before the establishment of OHS, OES coordinated, approved, and managed federal grants for terrorism readiness. However, in February 2003, the governor established OHS as the state agency to coordinate and approve all activities between state and federal agencies on topics related to terrorism, including all state requests for federal funds designated for terrorism-related activities. OHS is also responsible for developing guidelines for all such state requests and approving the distribution of any federal funds allocated to the State. OHS has designated OES to continue
to manage terrorism readiness grants, although OHS maintains final approval. Therefore, the federal grants that we discuss in this section are managed by OES, subject to OHS’s approval. OES also occasionally receives state funds for terrorism readiness activities. For example, OES received $562,000 for three staff to coordinate the activities of the committee on terrorism.

**The State Receives Funding From Two Federal Terrorism Readiness Grants**

Two federal grants fund the State's terrorism readiness efforts: the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Federal Emergency Management Agency Supplemental Grant for Emergency Operations Planning (FEMA Grant). OES administers other federal grants that it can use to respond to terrorist events; however, these grants are not specifically earmarked for terrorism.

*For federal fiscal year 2003, the State received $164.3 million in federal homeland security funds to allocate to local governments and to use for state-level activities.*

**The State Homeland Security Grant Program**

The State Homeland Security Grant Program, formerly known as the State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program, funds federally approved equipment and services that will enhance the capabilities of state and local jurisdictions to plan and respond to terrorism. The grant includes funding for purchasing equipment and planning, conducting, and evaluating exercises. For federal fiscal year 2003, the federal government awarded California $164.3 million under this grant program. The award occurred in two phases. The first phase amount, which was awarded to the State in May 2003, was $45 million, allocated to the following categories:

- $31.6 million for equipment
- $7.9 million for exercises
- $2.4 million for training
- $3.1 million for planning, assessment, strategy, and administration

OHS awarded 80 percent of the equipment, exercise, and planning funding to local governments and retained the remaining 20 percent for state-level activities. Additionally, as discussed previously, OHS provided the $2.4 million training allocation to the National Guard to coordinate the design of a new terrorism readiness training curriculum for state and local emergency response agencies. The State received the second
phase of the grant in June 2003. Of the $119.3 million awarded, $15.9 million was earmarked by the federal government to cover the costs state and local first responders have incurred during the war with Iraq for increased security at critical infrastructure sites and to cover costs incurred during future periods of heightened threat, contingent on guidance from the federal government. The remaining $103.4 million is for state and local activities for equipment, exercises, training, planning, and administration. As of June 2003, OHS expects to award 80 percent of the $103.4 million to local governments and retain 20 percent for state activities. Unlike the allocations specified in the first phase, how much funding will be spent on each category is at the discretion of the State and local governments.

**FEMA Grant**

In addition to the State Homeland Security Grant Program, the federal government provides terrorism readiness funding through the FEMA Grant. OES uses these funds to focus on comprehensive emergency planning, with emphasis given to updating the emergency plan and supporting planning documents to address all emergencies, including weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, and providing support to the committee on terrorism. Additionally, OES provides grants to local governments to update their plans for emergency operations, especially terrorism preparedness.

For the grant period from December 2002 to December 2003, the State was awarded $11.9 million for planning. Of this amount, OES distributed $8.9 million to local governments, retaining the remaining $3 million for state planning for emergency operations. The State was awarded another $50,000 to assess the emergency operation centers at counties\(^2\) and $100,000 more to modify the state center to house secure equipment.

**OES Has Established Methods for Identifying Potential Sources of Funding**

OES currently administers numerous state and federal grants that are provided either on an annual basis or when a disaster occurs. OES

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\(^2\) For additional information on county emergency preparedness, refer to audit report 2002-113, issued in July 2003.
coordinates with the respective federal agencies to maintain its awareness of any additional funds available through these programs. In addition, OES has a grant management section and a legislative affairs unit that identify funding sources by reviewing new state and federal legislation and Web sites, by establishing contacts with state and federal partner agencies, and through subscriptions to services such as the federal register notifications. Through its coordination with federal agencies, coordination with the governor’s offices in Sacramento and Washington, D.C., and membership in the National Emergency Management Association, OES is also made aware of any federal legislation that may potentially affect its funding opportunities.

The committee on terrorism has established a subcommittee that identifies funding for state and local agencies. The funding subcommittee began an effort to identify funding sources, such as federal grants, that state and local agencies could use to fund terrorism readiness activities; however, it has not yet completed this effort. Further, the subcommittee has not met since December 2002 and is not expected to meet again until July 2003. The director of OHS, who is the chair of the committee on terrorism, stated that he delayed the work of all the various subcommittees until OHS could review the structure of the committee on terrorism. He said this was necessary because he believed the committee on terrorism currently had too many subcommittees, rendering it inefficient. In July 2003, OHS plans to convene the committee on terrorism and begin to determine the subcommittees that will remain. The efforts of the funding subcommittee in identifying funding sources for the terrorism readiness activities of state and local agencies could lead to additional funds. If OHS does not use the funding subcommittee to identify potential funding sources, it should ensure that it has an effective mechanism to do so.

According to the director of OHS, a funding working group, comprising various state and local entities, assisted OHS in creating a funding plan. Submitted to the federal government in October 2002, the funding plan outlined the proposed distribution of federal homeland security funds in California. The working group is also to review the State’s system for allocating federal homeland security funds to determine if any adjustments are needed in the future. The efforts of the working group and the funding subcommittee both focus on funding. As discussed previously, OHS is reviewing the structure of the committee on terrorism and its subcommittees. OHS may find benefits in combining the work of the funding subcommittee and the working group.
OHS Has Recently Begun to Disburse State-Level Terrorism Readiness Funds

Although there are approximately $39 million in federal terrorism readiness funds from federal fiscal years 2000 through 2003 that could be used at the state level, the State has only recently received most of these funds and is now beginning to allocate them. Approximately $32 million of the $39 million was just awarded in May and June 2003. Of the remaining $7 million, $2.6 million had been available since August 2002, but OES had not yet allocated or expended these funds because it was directed to hold the funds by the director of OHS until his office developed a plan to allocate available terrorism readiness funds. Between August 2002 and February 2003, when the governor created OHS, OES held the funds in anticipation of OHS being established. The federal government allows the State to spend these funds on various terrorism readiness activities. For the federal fiscal year 2000 through the first phase of the 2003 award, the federal government awarded California more than $18 million for state-level terrorism readiness activities. The State can spend $8.9 million for equipment, $1.6 million for exercises, $4.7 million for exercises or equipment, $2.4 million for training, and $600,000 for planning. Additionally, in June 2003, in the second phase of the grant, the State was awarded approximately $21 million by the federal government, which allowed the State the discretion to determine how much to spend on equipment, exercises, training, and planning.

According to the director of OHS, before deciding how to allocate the state-level terrorism readiness funds, and soon after the governor's executive order created OHS, he assessed each state agency that claimed to have a first-responder role in terrorism readiness activities so that OHS could identify how much money the agency believed it needed to fulfill its responsibilities. OHS then determined whether the activities fit the mission of the agency and did not duplicate the services of another agency and if the amounts requested seemed reasonable. For example, according to the director of OHS, the California Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health Services, and the Emergency Medical Services Authority submitted plans that showed they would conduct some of the same activities. Rather than fund all the activities and have redundancies, OHS is meeting with each agency to identify their respective missions. OHS will then determine which agency should perform a particular activity and fund each activity accordingly. The director of OHS stated that he believes that
funding only those activities that are clearly part of an agency’s mission is the most fair and efficient way of allocating funds. He further stated that agencies with first-responder roles, such as the California Highway Patrol, the National Guard, the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, and the Department of Health Services, were placed higher on the funding list.

From the more than $18 million that was available for federal fiscal years 2000 through the first phase of the 2003 award, OHS in June 2003 allocated the $1.6 million for exercises and the $2.4 million for training to the National Guard, and allocated the $600,000 for planning to OES. Additionally, OHS allocated the remaining $13.7 million of equipment funds as displayed in the Table. OHS expects to allocate the $21 million the State was awarded in June 2003 later in the summer of 2003.

**TABLE**

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<th>Agency</th>
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OES Received Some State Funding for Terrorism Readiness

During the past three fiscal years, OES submitted two budget requests for additional state general funds for personnel and equipment related to terrorism readiness activities. OES requested in September 2000 and subsequently received $425,000 to purchase and maintain secure radio equipment. This equipment will allow OES personnel to communicate with two-way radios that cannot be monitored by the news media or public when responding to incidents involving sensitive communications such as criminal incidents or terrorist attacks. Also, OES requested in September 2001 and subsequently received $562,000 for three staff members to provide dedicated support and coordination to the committee on terrorism. OES believes that the increased staff and additional funding will enhance interagency coordination with state agencies.

Other states have various ways to fund terrorism readiness activities. For example, Florida allocated $2 million in state general funds for fiscal year 2002–03 to perform state-level exercises and to purchase personal protective equipment for first responders. Georgia began to devote state funds specifically toward terrorism readiness activities after the events of September 11, 2001. For example, it has added seven state-funded positions that are specifically focused on terrorism readiness activities. In addition, the Little Hoover Commission reported in January 2002 that some states, such as Florida, have created a dedicated revenue stream to help pay for preparedness efforts. Florida created a trust fund, financed by a surcharge on commercial and domestic property insurance, to finance emergency management efforts such as acquiring a geographic information system and a satellite communications system.

On the other hand, one state—Pennsylvania—told us that its terrorism readiness activities are financed exclusively with federal funds.

THE EFFECT OF OES BUDGET CUTS ARE UNCERTAIN

An OES analysis stated that budget cuts it is required to sustain due to the current state budget crisis will severely hinder its ability to fulfill its overall mission, including terrorism readiness. However, since February 2003, OES is to report to the Governor's Office through the OHS director, and the OHS director told us he believes that OES can meet its statutory mission despite budget cuts. Due to the current budget crisis, as of June 2003,
OES sustained a budget cut of $2.9 million for fiscal year 2002–03 and $8.2 million for fiscal year 2003–04. OES’s total General Fund budget for fiscal year 2002–03 after the cuts was $56 million.

In a January 2003 analysis, OES stated that these reductions in funding would severely hinder its ability to fulfill its public safety mission and would have a noticeable impact on the resources available to prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from emergencies, disasters, and acts of terrorism. For example, in relation to the CSTI, OES said that 10 positions, or 25 percent of CSTI’s staff, would be cut as part of the fiscal year 2002–03 budget cuts. The CSTI provides training to emergency response personnel in various areas, including terrorism. This training equips city, county, and state emergency services personnel with the knowledge and skills they need to effectively plan, respond, manage, and recover from emergency situations. Positions lost included four instructors and six support staff positions, including two registrars. According to the director of the CSTI, as of May 2003, it has not yet determined which of the courses will be cut from the schedule for next year because it is still in the process of identifying which instructors will be let go based on seniority. She is particularly concerned that one of the instructors with the least state seniority is a nationally recognized terrorism expert.

Additionally, the director of the CSTI believes that the loss of registrar positions is especially problematic, as this is the primary contact person for students and is critical to getting students registered in the classes, including making sure that payments are received. The director of the CSTI points out that as OES reduces the number of courses it is able to offer, the amount of tuition brought in will decrease, which affects the amount of reimbursements in OES’s budget. In addition, OES has seen a decline in student enrollment as a result of cuts in local government spending on emergency management training. Although other state agencies such as the National Guard, the Department of Health Services, and the California Environmental Protection Agency have expressed interest in receiving training from the CSTI in the Standardized Emergency Management System as well as other areas, OES is not sure it can meet this need because of the staff cuts at the CSTI. OES is also uncertain about meeting its internal training needs.

How OES Plans to Sustain Budget Reductions

- Cut positions, including instructors at the California Specialized Training Institute.
- Reduce staffing and operating expenses at the Disaster Assistance Pasadena Office.
- Reduce staffing and operating expenses at the Coastal Regional Emergency Operations Center.
- Eliminate the annual earthquake campaign and funding for the dam safety programs.
- Reduce maintenance of the California Integrated Seismic Network.
- Reduce administration and executive support.
- Reduce local assistance.
because the cuts not only affect instructors but also support staff who are members of OES’s training committee and oversee the training database.

However, the director of OHS stated that he believes OES can fulfill its responsibilities even with the budget cuts that have been sustained as of June 2003. In fact, he believes neither OHS nor OES need additional funding from the State. Moreover, the director of OHS wants to optimize the efficiency of OES resources. In pursuit of this goal, he intends to assess the OES organization as early as the summer of 2003 and expects to identify more efficient ways for OES to fulfill its statutory responsibilities, focusing its resources on mission-related activities.

According to the director of OHS, the funding that OHS receives from the federal government should be sufficient for the State to implement its terrorism response plan activities, provided that the federal government allows the State flexibility in how the money is spent. For example, in the past, some grants specified that the money could only be spent on equipment, even though there might have been a greater need for training. Current grants are more flexible, and the State can use them for training, exercises, planning, and administration as well. Additionally, the director stated that OHS is working with the federal government to clarify whether overtime costs incurred by local emergency staff are eligible for reimbursement from federal terrorism readiness funds and to determine if the State can fund positions—specifically intelligence analyst positions—with federal money.

**CLARIFICATION OF THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OHS AND OES WOULD BE BENEFICIAL**

As discussed in the Introduction, in February 2003, the governor established OHS within the Governor’s Office. Some of the responsibilities assigned to OHS by the executive order and to the director of OES appear to have the potential to overlap. For example, under the act, the director of OES is assigned the responsibility of coordinating the emergency activities of all state agencies during a state of war emergency or other state emergency, and every state agency and officer is required to cooperate with the director in rendering assistance. Further, under the act, the extraordinary powers granted to the governor to mitigate emergency situations may be delegated by the governor to the director of OES. However, the executive order
assigns OHS the responsibility of coordinating the security efforts of all departments and agencies of the State and the activities of all state agencies pertaining to terrorism-related issues, and it designates OHS as the principal point of contact for the governor. Moreover, the director of OES is required to report to the governor through OHS, but that reporting function is not limited to issues relating to state security or terrorism and thus appears to require OES to make all reports to the governor through OHS. Finally, an organizational chart located on the State’s Web site suggests that OHS has oversight responsibility over OES. Therefore, it appears that the responsibilities of OHS and OES may overlap.

We asked OES and OHS to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities, and both indicated that they believe the executive order is clear. The director of OES further commented that although state agency administrators typically report to the governor through his various policy assistants, the executive order formalizes the day-to-day reporting relationship that OES and the Office of Criminal Justice Planning have with OHS with respect to matters assigned to OHS. He acknowledged that he reports to the director of OHS for terrorism-related issues. However, he also stated that the press release accompanying the executive order made it clear that OHS would provide coordination of all state agencies for terrorism-related issues but that it did not address OES specifically or any shifts in the organization of state government. The director of OES further added that California, like many other states, is going through a process to review and build on its existing systems and organizations to ensure that it has the best system possible to address terrorism. He continued by saying that during this process, there will undoubtedly be times when the organizational relationships are both complex and evolving.

In his statements to us, the director of OHS concurred that reorganization and change are difficult. Further, because his focus is homeland security, he acknowledges that he would be more involved with terrorism-related issues than other aspects of OES’s operations. However, in contrast to the perspective of the director of OES, the director of OHS believes he has “across the board” authority for all areas of OES’s operations. This apparent lack of clarity in OHS’s and OES’s respective roles and responsibilities could adversely affect the State’s ability to respond to emergencies, such as a terrorist event.
Given that OES is established by statute and that OHS is established by executive order, further clarification of the respective roles and responsibilities of OES and OHS could help avoid misunderstandings, particularly if OHS is envisioned as a permanent part of state government. For example, under the California Constitution, the governor may assign and reorganize functions among executive officers and agencies in the manner provided by state law. Under state law, when the governor determines that reorganization of state agencies is in the public interest, he has authority to prepare a reorganization plan to the Legislature for review, which may become effective as early as 60 days following submission. Alternatively, legislation could clarify the roles of OES and OHS, particularly with respect to the coordination of state agencies during an emergency.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure that the State is adequately prepared to address terrorist threats, OHS should do the following:

• Continue its plans to develop a state plan on terrorism that includes a prevention element.

• Continue its plans to thoroughly assess OES functions to determine how it can optimize its efficiency.

• Consider the benefits of combining the funding subcommittee of the committee on terrorism with the homeland security funding working group.

• Work with the governor on how best to clarify the roles and responsibilities of OHS and OES.

To ensure that state agencies, including OES, are adequately prepared to respond to terrorist events occurring within the State, OES should do the following:

• Identify the most critical training required by staff at the state and regional centers and then allocate existing funding or seek additional funding it needs to deliver the training.

• Assist the National Guard in providing state-level terrorism readiness exercises.
Given the events of September 11, 2001, and the evolving nature of the terrorist threat, OHS and OES should do the following:

- Ensure that the state plan addressing terrorism is reviewed on a regular basis and updated as determined necessary to ensure that it adequately addresses current threats and benefits from the lessons learned in actual terrorist readiness events occurring both in California and nationwide.

- Develop a checklist to guide periodic evaluations of the state plan addressing terrorism to ensure that such assessments are consistent and effective.
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CHAPTER 2

Although the California National Guard Has Begun to Define Its Role in State Terrorism Prevention and Response, Several Constraints May Limit Its Effectiveness

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The California National Guard (National Guard) responds to state emergencies as directed by the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES). To outline its role in the State's response to terrorist events and identify key actions it must take in readiness for its likely missions, the National Guard has developed an overall strategy as well as specific plans and procedures. Despite working toward completing several of the critical objectives of its overall strategy, the National Guard advised us that many require actions from bodies outside the National Guard, such as the U.S. Congress and the state Legislature; therefore, the National Guard has not yet fully accomplished its overall strategy.

Most of the training performed by the National Guard is federally funded and designed to prepare the organization to meet its federal military missions. Although these federal missions do not specifically involve terrorism readiness, the State can take advantage of the skills possessed by National Guard forces when responding to terrorist events occurring within California. The National Guard's Joint Operations Center is responsible for receiving requests for state missions from OES and developing and overseeing the National Guard's response to requests.

In two important areas, the National Guard's training is lacking and could hinder its ability to respond promptly and effectively to state missions. First, although the Joint Operations Center has identified the training its staff need to effectively coordinate missions and perform the functions of the Joint Operations Center, many of the 38 staff have not received even half of the necessary training. The deputy director of the Joint Operations Center told us that lack of funding and limited availability of classes have hindered its ability to train its Joint Operations Center staff in the areas identified. Second, the National Guard's
Army Guard Division does not provide terrorism readiness training, which is federally required and designed to protect National Guard units against terrorist threats. According to the commanders of the Army Guard units we visited, they do not provide the training because National Guard management has not given them the guidance they need to implement terrorism readiness training.

Finally, although an analysis focusing on a key measure of recruiting and retention success indicates that the efforts of California's National Guard have not been as successful as those of National Guard forces in many other states and territories, it has managed to finish near its end-strength goals for each of the last four years. Further, its ranking among states and territories does not have a direct correlation to its readiness for its missions, including responding to terrorist events. However, federal deployments of National Guard units do affect the availability of National Guard units to respond to state missions. Since the military missions assigned to the National Guard by the Department of Defense are its primary missions, National Guard units that are activated by the federal government are not available to respond to state missions.

The California National Guard has developed a strategy and procedures to guide its response to terrorist events

The National Guard’s December 2002 Homeland Security Strategy defines key objectives the National Guard must meet to be prepared for missions it likely will receive.

The events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated a new level of threat to the United States and demanded that government take the necessary steps to ensure the safety of U.S. citizens. In response to this demand, in December 2002, the National Guard developed the Homeland Security Strategy (Homeland Security Strategy), which identifies objectives it must achieve to prepare for, help prevent, and respond to terrorist events within the State. The National Guard has also developed a plan that guides its response to terrorist events, as well as other emergencies to which it is asked to respond within the State. When the National Guard does respond to an emergency, such as a terrorist event, its response is coordinated through the Joint Operations Center. The National Guard has developed standard operating procedures for the Joint Operations Center to describe relationships and delineate responsibilities for those working in the Joint Operations Center. Finally, the National Guard has developed a process to annually review and assess its operational plan to ensure that it is up-to-date.
The National Strategy for Homeland Security—a comprehensive plan for terrorism response prepared by the federal Office of Homeland Security—states that the nation’s approach to homeland security is based on the principles of shared responsibility and partnership with Congress, state and local governments, the private sector, and the American people. As a critical element in the State’s response to emergencies that occur in California, the National Guard developed its Homeland Strategy in December 2002, describing its role in the State’s response to a terrorist event and defining key objectives it must meet to be prepared for missions it likely will receive. The National Guard has taken steps to accomplish several of the objectives identified in the Homeland Strategy. However, the executive officer of the National Guard’s homeland security office stated that because many of the objectives require actions from entities outside the National Guard—including the state Legislature and the U.S. Congress—the National Guard has not yet fully accomplished its overall strategy. Nonetheless, the California National Guard’s terrorism readiness planning appears to be more advanced than those of its counterparts in the four states we reviewed. None of the four state National Guard forces that gave us information on their plans had an established terrorism readiness plan that outlined their roles in responding to terrorism in their states. A fifth state told us it had a terrorism readiness plan but declined to provide it to us for review. Appendix B discusses the Homeland Strategy in more detail and describes the National Guard’s progress in completing its objectives.

The National Guard responds to emergencies that occur within the State as directed by OES. To guide its response to these missions, the National Guard has developed a plan of operations that not only identifies the basic concepts underlying a response to all missions but also includes annexes that provide more specific guidance for particular types of emergencies, including terrorism. The plan appears to give an adequate level of guidance to allow for an organized and efficient response to state missions the National Guard will likely receive. This plan also establishes the National Guard’s Ready Reaction Force, which is designed to respond quickly to certain emergencies. Appendix B discusses the plan of operations in greater detail.

In addition to the operational plan, the National Guard has developed procedures for its Joint Operations Center to follow in coordinating the National Guard’s response to state missions. These procedures describe the various areas of responsibility
within the Joint Operations Center and define what each area needs to accomplish during a response to a state mission. These procedures appear to provide sufficient guidance to allow for a coordinated response to any state mission.

In response to a concern we raised in an audit released in February 2002, the National Guard has developed a process to annually review its operational plan, identify needed changes, and update the plan as needed. As part of this process, the National Guard is implementing a software program to better track its progress in updating the operational plan. We further discuss the National Guard’s efforts in this area in Appendix B.

ALTHOUGH FEDERAL MILITARY TRAINING GENERALLY PROVIDES THE CAPABILITIES THAT THE NATIONAL GUARD USES FOR STATE MISSIONS, ADDITIONAL TRAINING IS NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO TERRORISM

Training provided by the federal government generally provides National Guard units with the skills needed to respond to state missions, but additional training is needed to respond adequately to terrorist events. Each member of the National Guard is assigned one or more specialties—such as infantry soldier, pilot, or military police officer—for which they receive military training that qualifies the member to perform the associated duties. In responding to state missions, the National Guard draws on the skills its members obtained through their specialty training. Therefore, the National Guard generally does not have to provide additional skills training to its members to respond to state missions. Any supplemental training a commander deems necessary to effectively carry out the state mission is given to members as part of the response to the mission. However, the National Guard has not provided its Joint Operations Center staff with much of the training they need to properly coordinate an effective response to state missions. Additionally, the Army Guard Division does not provide terrorism awareness training—designed to protect its members, their families, and its resources—to its members as required by U.S. Army regulations. Further, although the National Guard’s civil support teams are required to receive a significant amount of training in responding to incidents of weapons of mass destruction—including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents—we found that many of the members of these teams have not received all the required training. Finally, although the National Guard performs periodic internal exercises to evaluate
its ability to respond to terrorist events and other emergencies, it
does not periodically exercise with other state and local agencies
to practice coordinating an effective response.

Wartime Specialty Training Gives National Guard Units the
Skills They Need to Respond to State Missions

Most of the training performed by the National
Guard is federally funded and designed to
prepare the organization to accomplish its federal
missions. Although the federal missions are
not specifically related to terrorism readiness,
National Guard members use the skills they
obtain in training for and performing their
military specialties to respond to state terrorism
readiness missions. Commanders may identify
additional training that members need to achieve
a particular mission. The five other state National
Guard forces from which we obtained information
reported similar reliance on the military specialty
skills of their members to respond to terrorism
readiness missions in their states.

In June 2002, the National Guard developed a
skills matrix that identifies the federal military
capabilities that National Guard units possess and
are most likely to use during state emergencies.
Additionally, the matrix identifies, through a color-coding
system, the current capability of the National Guard to
provide the identified skills based on factors such as federal
deployments, training, and equipment repairs. This matrix
is maintained by the Joint Operations Center and is updated
weekly to reflect the current status of National Guard units.

To identify additional training that guard members need to
complete a particular mission, the commander develops a
Mission Essential Task List (METL) to specify the required
training. For example, as of June 2003, the National Guard has
a task force made up of four teams guarding the Golden Gate
Bridge in San Francisco 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The
task force commander identified four specific areas in the METL
outlining the training he believes is necessary for task force
members to have to be prepared to achieve the mission. The
training identified in the METL included weapons qualification;
understanding the various law enforcement jurisdictions
surrounding the bridge area; nuclear, biological, and chemical

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<th>Some of the Military Skills the National Guard Monitors for State Missions</th>
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training; and an abbreviated version of the training that law enforcement officers receive. Various types of training related to this METL are included in the task force’s scheduled training, and the training is provided to the members accordingly.

To determine if task force members were actually receiving the training identified in the METLs, we judgmentally selected a sample of 15 of the 44 members from the Golden Gate Bridge Task Force and reviewed the task force training records. We used a judgmental sample to ensure that each of the four task force teams was represented. We found that 14 of the 15 members received all the training. One member did not receive all the training because he was serving on active military duty during the time the training classes were given. According to a leader of the task force, the task force member was briefed on the training that was missed. Therefore, it appears that generally the task force members are receiving training related to the METLs established by task force commanders.

Because the National Guard largely relies on military training to ensure that its members are prepared for state missions, we reviewed the unit status reports of three of the 23 Army Guard units and two of the five Air Guard units that had been assigned a role in the Ready Reaction Force. Army Guard units prepare unit status reports each quarter, stating the unit’s readiness level to fulfill its assigned mission and the number of members who are qualified in their assigned military specialty. For the quarter ending March 2003, we found that two of the three units did not meet their army training readiness goals. Air Guard units prepare similar reports each month to state their readiness to fulfill their assigned missions, including training. Both the Air Guard units we reviewed reported in March 2003 that they had met their readiness goals. Readiness goals are the levels, established by the respective military services, that each unit must meet to be ready to respond to a mission.

Although two of the three Army Guard units we reviewed are not meeting their readiness goals, the National Guard believes it does not adversely affect its ability to respond to state missions because it uses the task force concept.

Although two of the three Army Guard units we reviewed are not meeting their readiness goals, the National Guard believes this does not adversely affect its ability to respond to state missions because it uses the task force concept to respond to state emergencies. The task force concept refers to the practice of forming an ad hoc force from any of the National Guard units that are available—including Army Guard and Air Guard—based on the skills that the National Guard identifies as necessary to fulfill the mission it has been given. Therefore, under this concept, members and equipment from an Air Guard wing could
join members and equipment from an Army Guard company to form a task force that would respond to a state mission. Accordingly, the National Guard will not likely need entire units to respond to state missions. Indeed, the director of the Joint Operations Center told us it is not abnormal for units to not meet their readiness goals due to normal turnover, the length of time needed to sufficiently train members in new specialties, limited availability of training, federal budget shortfalls, and limited equipment. Therefore, to the extent that the National Guard has a sufficient number of trained members to meet the requirements of state missions under the task force concept of operations, it should be able to respond to any likely mission.

**Joint Operations Center Staff Have Not Yet Completed All the Training They Need to Effectively Coordinate Missions**

The Joint Operations Center is responsible for receiving state missions from OES and developing and overseeing the National Guard’s response to requests for its services. In June 2002, the Joint Operations Center identified training it believes its staff need to adequately respond to state emergencies. However, many of the staff have not had all the identified training. Without proper training, the ability of the National Guard to respond promptly and effectively to state missions may deteriorate.

The Joint Operations Center uses a matrix to track the progress each staff member has made in taking the training courses identified as necessary to effectively fulfill his or her responsibilities. However, 32 of the 38 members required to take specific courses had received less than half of the designated training. According to the deputy director of the Joint Operations Center, lack of funding and limited availability of classes have hindered its ability to train its Joint Operations Center staff in the identified areas. Therefore, the Joint Operations Center would benefit from continuing to pursue the training identified as necessary for its staff and to seek the funding it needs to ensure that they are adequately trained.

Some classes the Joint Operations Center identified are free on-line courses, and the Joint Operations Center's training officer advised us that these will be incorporated into its training plans. According to its deputy director, the Joint Operations Center requested additional funding for the other classes but, due to higher organizational priorities, the National Guard did not approve the training. He added that the Joint Operations Center is currently working with one of the training providers to see if the tuition can be waived if National Guard staff assist the
training provider in delivering other training. In April 2003, the Joint Operations Center established a new list of training courses its staff need to adequately respond to state emergencies. This list includes even more classes than the previous one, thereby compounding the problem.

The Army Guard Division Does Not Provide Required Terrorism Awareness Training to Its Members

U.S. Army regulations issued in January 2002 require the adjutant general—the head of the National Guard—to implement a terrorism readiness force protection program (force protection program) in the Army Guard Division. In addition, the adjutant general is required to publish guidelines for the division to follow in implementing the force protection program, which is designed to protect National Guard members, their families, and its resources from terrorist threats. The director of the Joint Operations Center has been assigned the responsibility to implement the force protection program for the National Guard. Although the National Guard has fully implemented a similar program in the Air Guard Division and has implemented some parts of the force protection program in the Army Guard Division, it has not annually provided the required terrorism awareness training to its Army Guard members. Without this necessary training, Army Guard members are less prepared for terrorist threats.

To determine whether the National Guard has implemented the force protection program in the Army Guard and Air Guard as required by federal regulations, we selected three Army Guard units and two Air Guard units and determined whether they had provided the required terrorism awareness training. Although separate regulations apply to the Army Guard and Air Guard divisions, both regulations require, among other things, that units provide annual terrorism awareness training to all their members. We found that the National Guard has implemented several parts of the Army force protection program at the headquarters level, such as appointing a terrorism readiness officer and establishing a terrorism readiness steering committee. Additionally, the Air Guard units have fully implemented the terrorism awareness training requirements of the force protection program. However, we found that none of the three Army Guard units we reviewed has provided the annual terrorism awareness training as required by U.S. Army regulations. Indeed, one of the unit commanders was not aware of the regulation at all.

Without the required terrorism awareness training, Army Guard members are less prepared for terrorist threats.
According to the commanders of the Army Guard units we visited, the reason they have not fully implemented the terrorism awareness training is that they have not received the guidance to implement it. The regulation provides that the units can offer their members the required training either through an approved Web-based course or from a specially trained instructor using an approved lesson plan. The director of the Joint Operations Center, who is responsible for implementing the National Guard’s force protection program, acknowledges that it has not issued guidance to the Army Guard units. Further, according to the director of the Joint Operations Center, the U.S. Army simply does not have enough qualified trainers to provide the training. The director added that his office had been unaware of an approved Web-based course until recently.

However, while visiting an Air Guard unit in April 2003, we discovered that it had been using a Web-based course to fulfill the requirement for terrorism awareness training since June 2002. Therefore, despite its responsibility for implementing the force protection program in both the Air Guard and Army Guard divisions, the Joint Operations Center was unaware of the practices of the Air Guard Division that could have benefited the Army Guard Division. Had the Joint Operations Center been more aware of the training being utilized in the Air Guard Division, it could have identified this best practice and shared it with the Army Guard Division. Without terrorism awareness training, members of the Army Guard are less prepared to protect themselves, their families, and National Guard assets from terrorist threats.

Some Members of the Civil Support Teams Have Not Received All Their Required Training, but the U.S. Army Considers Them Fully Able to Respond to Potential Terrorist Activities

Although not all members of the State’s two civil support teams have taken all federal and state required training courses, the U.S. Army has recently assessed the units and found them fully ready to perform their mission. A civil support team is divided into six areas of expertise: command, operations, survey, medical, communications, and logistics/administration. To attain the high level of competency expected of these units, the National Guard Bureau has listed more than 1,400 hours of training that various members of the civil support team must take, depending on their areas of expertise.
The federal government created civil support teams to provide states with a resource in responding to potential terrorist activities involving weapons of mass destruction, which can include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents. Although the units are federally funded, they are under the direction of the governor. At present, 32 civil support teams are scattered throughout the country with two teams currently in place within California: the 9th civil support team in Los Alamitos and the 95th in Hayward. Although the civil support teams are under the operational control of the governor, the National Guard Bureau mandates a minimum level of competency, and the U.S. Army evaluates the teams every 18 months.

Federal requirements direct civil support team members to obtain certain competencies. The National Guard Bureau identifies the courses that team members must complete to obtain these competencies. Additionally, state regulations require that civil support team members receive training in handling hazardous materials. The National Guard Bureau has designated more than 1,400 hours of training in a variety of topics that members of the civil support teams must complete, depending on their positions. However, many team members have not completed all the required training. Specifically, 20 of the 21 members of the 9th civil support team were not fully trained, although only one of the 20 members had 50 percent or less of the training required for the member’s position. For the 95th civil support team, we found that 15 of the 23 members were not fully trained, with only four of the 15 receiving 50 percent or less of the required training.

According to the commander of the 9th civil support team, several factors have prevented its members from receiving all their required training. He said that the team’s training and deployment requirements, as well as other scheduling issues, result in team members taking between one and two years to complete all the necessary training. He also said that training priorities for courses at the national level are often set aside for newly established civil support teams; therefore, the 9th civil support team has experienced the burden of pursuing classes that have been set aside for others. Finally, the commander of the 9th civil support team told us that as part of their normal career progression, members leave the civil support teams to begin jobs of increasing rank and responsibility; therefore, new team members must be trained to fill the open positions. He concluded by saying that the goal of the 9th civil support team is to have all members 100 percent trained on identified
courses, that their turnover is stabilizing, and that the training completion rate continues to increase. According to the senior operations officer of the 95th civil support team, three of the four individuals that lacked most of their required training were newly assigned to the team and are in the process of receiving training. The fourth individual was delayed in receiving training while recovering from a medical condition.

Although not all members of the 9th and 95th civil support teams have taken all their required classes, both teams have passed the necessary certification required by the Department of Defense and, according to a U.S. Army representative, both teams did “extremely well” on recent army evaluations. Specifically, the army recently assessed both civil support teams—the 9th in November 2002 and the 95th in March 2003—regarding their readiness to fulfill their missions and found that both are sufficiently prepared. Therefore, despite the difficulties the civil support teams have encountered in providing its members with all the required training, it does not appear as though the U.S. Army believes it has affected their ability to achieve their missions.

The National Guard Would Benefit From Increased State-Level Terrorism Exercises

In analyzing its ability to respond to homeland security missions, the director of the National Guard’s Joint Operations Center states that much of its success is achieved through the building of relationships with state and local emergency response agencies. The director states that as the need for National Guard support increases with the risk of terrorism, so does its need to participate in exercises with state and local authorities. However, these opportunities have been few because, as discussed in Chapter 1, OES has not developed and administered terrorism readiness exercises involving state and local emergency response agencies. These agencies need to participate in terrorism readiness exercises to ensure that they are adequately prepared to respond to actual terrorism events.

According to the director of the Joint Operations Center, the National Guard performs internal exercises for its operational plan at least quarterly. We were able to observe portions of one of these exercises during our audit. In a typical exercise, the Joint Operations Center assembles staff and provides a scenario relating to one of the emergencies covered by the National Guard’s operational plan (one of which is terrorism). The Joint Operations Center staff then assess the participants
as they develop and implement a plan to respond to the scenario. This experience enables participants to work through the decision-making processes involved in responding to a state mission and helps prepare them for actual missions. In performing these exercises, the National Guard is ahead of most of its counterparts in the other states from which we obtained information. Specifically, all five state National Guard forces that gave us information said they do not have regular terrorism readiness exercises related to their potential state missions. However, some mentioned they conducted exercises to ensure that they are ready to protect their own forces when carrying out their duties.

Although these internal exercises are valuable, the director of the Joint Operations Center told us that the National Guard has not had sufficient funding to participate in exercises with other state and local emergency response agencies. In fact, in fiscal year 2002–03, the limited state funding it did receive to perform exercises was eliminated. The director of the Joint Operations Center told us that the lack of funding limits the ability of all state and local emergency response agencies, including the National Guard, to practice their emergency plans and become better prepared if an actual emergency occurs. As discussed in Chapter 1, the State’s Office of Homeland Security (OHS) has assumed control of state and federal terrorism readiness funds and is responsible for determining how state-level funds should be allocated. In June 2003, OHS advised us that it has now allocated $1.6 million in federal funding to the National Guard to coordinate terrorism readiness exercises that include both state agencies and rural jurisdictions. Therefore, the National Guard should soon be able to participate in terrorism readiness exercises with other state and local emergency response agencies.

In June 2003, OHS allocated $1.6 million in federal funds to the National Guard to coordinate terrorism readiness exercises that include both state agencies and rural jurisdictions.

THE NATIONAL GUARD HAS FEW FUNDS EARMARKED FOR TERRORISM READINESS, AND ITS REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDING HAVE BEEN DENIED

During fiscal year 2002–03, about 93 percent of the National Guard’s funding came from the federal government. Out of the $635 million in federal funds the National Guard reported receiving, only $70,000 was specifically earmarked for terrorism readiness activities. It used these funds to pay the expenses of staff that attended terrorism readiness courses. Another $1.7 million was used to help fund the civil support teams. The National Guard also receives approximately $5 million annually from the federal
government to fund its force protection program, which serves to protect the security of National Guard personnel and assets. None of the $42 million the National Guard received in state funds was earmarked for activities related to terrorism readiness. The California National Guard is not alone in this regard; none of the five state National Guard forces from which we obtained information reported receiving state funds specifically for terrorism readiness training activities.

The National Guard has requested additional funding related to terrorism readiness from both the State and the federal government. In fiscal years 2001–02 through 2003–04, the National Guard submitted requests to the State for more than $10 million in additional state funding for activities that were at least in part related to terrorism readiness. These requests included funding for additional staff to maintain the Joint Operations Center, exercises involving state missions, and the establishment of a homeland security office. However, the deputy director of the Joint Operations Center advised us that all these requests were denied and that the National Guard is pursuing other sources for this funding.

Although all the requests for additional state funding were denied, OHS allocated $5.6 million in federal funds to the National Guard in June 2003. The $5.6 million is to be used to develop training and coordinate exercises to prepare state and local emergency responders for terrorist events, as well as to pay for equipment for the National Guard's own needs. Additionally, as we discuss further in Appendix B, the National Guard recently completed an assessment of its homeland security mission and submitted a request for more than $156 million to the federal government. This assessment identified additional training, materials, and personnel that the National Guard believes it needs to fulfill its homeland security mission. Specific items on this list included funding for exercises, weapons qualification, law enforcement training, and equipment for operating in contaminated environments. However, as of June 2003, the National Guard had not yet been informed whether the federal National Guard Bureau would fund these items. According to the executive officer of the National Guard's homeland security office, his office plans to have two individuals that will be responsible for identifying and applying for additional funds for terrorism readiness activities.
ALTHOUGH THE NATIONAL GUARD’S RECRUITING AND RETENTION HAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED ITS READINESS, FEDERAL DEPLOYMENTS LIMIT THE AVAILABILITY OF KEY ASSETS TO THE STATE

An analysis focusing on a key measure of recruiting and retention success indicates that California’s National Guard ranks below many state and territorial National Guard forces. Nonetheless, the National Guard has been able to recruit and retain enough members to reach about 97 percent or more of its end-strength goal—that is, the number of members for which the National Guard is funded—in each of the past four federal fiscal years. Therefore, although it may not be as successful, on a percentage basis, as other state and territorial National Guard forces, its recruitment and retention does not appear to have affected the National Guard’s ability to meet its overall needs. However, key units within the National Guard have been deployed into federal service, rendering their special skills unavailable to the State. The Army Guard units significantly affected by deployments include the military police, engineering, and transportation units. These units are also the ones most often required by the State. Therefore, when these units are federally deployed, the State must look elsewhere to meet its needs. OES told us that the State can replace some of the capabilities offered by the National Guard through other agencies, but the National Guard’s specialized equipment is critical.

The National Guard Is Generally Meeting Its End-Strength Goals

Recruiting and retention requirements do not necessarily equate with readiness capabilities. The National Guard Bureau issues a monthly assessment of the state and territorial National Guard forces’ recruiting and retention efforts. Until recently, the National Guard Bureau called its assessment report the Readiness Planning Guide. However, the title of this report resulted in some confusion because recruiting and retention do not necessarily correlate with readiness. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, determining the readiness of National Guard units requires reviewing the Army Guard unit status reports—or the equivalent Air Guard reports—that identify the units’ readiness levels to fulfill their missions. Additionally, as we also have previously discussed, to the extent that the National Guard has a sufficient number of trained members to meet the requirements of state missions under the task force concept of operations, it should be able to respond to the missions.
The number of positions funded by the National Guard Bureau determines the National Guard’s end-strength goals. Although the Air Guard has been generally more successful than the Army Guard has in reaching end-strength goals, the Army Guard has nevertheless reached about 97 percent or more of its end-strength goals over the past four federal fiscal years. Nonetheless, in February 2002, the National Guard Bureau ranked the Army Guard 51st among the 54 state and territorial National Guard forces in recruiting and retention. In determining this ranking, the National Guard Bureau considered the Army Guard’s overall recruiting and retention efforts, as well as its recruiting and retention efforts related specifically to certain officers.

The National Guard Bureau no longer provides this ranking in its monthly assessments. Therefore, we computed our own ranking that focused on a key measure of recruiting and retention success—the extent to which end-strength goals were attained. We analyzed data we obtained from the National Guard Bureau as of September 2002, the end of the most recent federal fiscal year. For each of the 54 state and territorial Army Guard forces, we compared the end strength attained by the Army Guard to its end-strength goals and computed the percentage of end-strength goal attained. We found that the California Army Guard ranked 33rd among the 54 state and territorial Army Guard forces using this measure. Nonetheless, the California Army Guard was able to end this period at 99.7 percent of its end-strength goal. Therefore, it appears that the Army Guard’s recruiting and retention practices have been reasonably successful.

We performed a similar analysis for the Air Guard and found that the California Air Guard ranked 25th among the 54 state and territorial Air Guard forces in its ability to recruit and retain members. Despite this, the Air Guard attained an end strength of 99.3 percent of its goal. Therefore, it appears that the Air Guard has also been reasonably successful in its recruiting and retention practices.

Nevertheless, the National Guard recruiters advised us that recruiting in the current year has been adversely affected by recent federal and state deployments. In fact, the superintendent for recruiting for the Air Guard told us that it will likely not meet its end-strength goals for federal fiscal year 2003, which ends in September 2003. Thus, the National Guard should continue to monitor the results of its recruiting and retention efforts, and if it finds that the results of these efforts adversely impact its ability to respond to missions, the National Guard should seek legislative or other remedies to address its problems.
Federal Deployments Limit the Availability of California National Guard Units to Respond to State Missions

The National Guard stated in its Homeland Strategy issued in December 2002 that it does not have the capability to respond to the requirements of both the federal and state missions it anticipates receiving. Therefore, since its federal mission is its priority, when National Guard assets are deployed for federal missions, it may not be able to meet the needs of the State. The Air Guard and Army Guard have deployed numerous units in response to recent military actions. The deployment has resulted in a depletion of specific manpower and equipment that might be detrimental to the National Guard’s ability to respond to state missions. For example, most of the military police in the Army Guard have been deployed as well as more than one-third of the engineers and truck drivers, and the majority of these Army Guard members are still deployed. In the Air Guard Division, half the C-130 E cargo planes it uses were deployed in May 2003, but these aircraft have since returned. Currently, the primary effect of deployments is the lack of military police, with more than 90 percent of the National Guard’s military police mobilized and deployed. However, the State can draw from the resources of various state and local agencies to fill that void in an emergency. For example, the California Highway Patrol could step in to fill the role of the military police. Nonetheless, a representative from the OES executive office advised us that although some capabilities offered by the National Guard can be replaced by other agencies, the National Guard plays a critical role in support of requests for specialized equipment. Many of the Army Guard units are still deployed, and other units may need to be deployed as the needs of the military continue to shift.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure that its members are adequately trained to respond to terrorism missions, the National Guard should do the following:

- Determine the most critical training its Joint Operations Center staff need to fulfill their duties and then allocate existing funding or seek the needed funding to provide the training, documenting why it is needed.

- Develop guidance for its Army Guard Division to implement its terrorism readiness force protection program.
• Ensure that its Joint Staff Division, including the Joint Operations Center, share best practices between its Air Guard and Army Guard divisions.

• Use the recently awarded funds from OHS to identify the type and frequency of state-level exercises responding to terrorist events that the State needs to be adequately prepared. The National Guard should then provide the exercises it has identified.

The National Guard should continue to monitor the results of its recruiting and retention efforts. If those efforts begin to adversely affect its ability to respond to state missions, it should seek legislative or other remedies to address its problems.

We conducted this review under the authority vested in the California State Auditor by Section 8543 et seq. of the California Government Code and according to generally accepted government auditing standards. We limited our review to those areas specified in the audit scope section of this report.

Respectfully submitted,

ELAINE M. HOWLE
State Auditor

Date: July 31, 2003

Staff: Karen L. McKenna, CPA, Audit Principal
David E. Biggs, CPA
Theresa M. Carey, CPA, CFE
Tameka V. Hutcherson
Roberta A. Kennedy
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APPENDIX A

The State Emergency Plan and the Terrorism Response Plan Appear to Provide Adequate Guidance for Agencies to Respond to Terrorist Events

The California Emergency Services Act (act) establishes the requirement for a State Emergency Plan (emergency plan) and requires that it be in effect in each political subdivision of the State. The act also requires the governing body of each political subdivision of the State to carry out the provisions of the emergency plan. The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) is responsible for maintaining the emergency plan and for assisting local governments and other state agencies in developing their own emergency plans. The emergency plan, which includes an annex called the terrorism response plan, provides the framework for the State’s response to all types of emergencies, including terrorism, and establishes the systems and functions that agencies will use in responding to emergencies. Together, the emergency and terrorism response plans appear to provide adequate guidance for responding to an act of terrorism.

The emergency plan primarily consists of the basic plan and a section on the organization for response and recovery operations. The basic plan is intended to be general in its application and provide for flexibility during response and recovery. It describes the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), the California Emergency Organization, and the phases of emergency management, and it establishes the priorities of emergency operations.

The act requires the State to use the SEMS for managing its response to multiagency and multijurisdictional emergencies. Local governments must use the SEMS to be eligible for funding for their personnel-related costs under state disaster assistance programs. The SEMS consists of five organizational levels, which are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priorities When Conducting Emergency Operations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Protecting life (highest priority), property, and the environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Meeting the immediate emergency needs of people, including rescue, medical care, food, shelter, and clothing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Temporarily restoring facilities that are essential to the health, safety, and welfare of people.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Meeting the rehabilitation needs of people, including provisions of temporary housing, food stamps, and employment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Mitigating hazards that pose a threat to life, property, and the environment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
activated as necessary to respond to emergencies: field response (the emergency site); local government (city, county, or other local jurisdiction); operational area (the county and all political subdivisions within the county, which coordinates between local and regional); regional (which coordinates between the State and the operational area); and the State (OES coordinates the state response at its state operations center and regional emergency operations centers). The SEMS incorporates the use of the incident command system and the Master Mutual Aid Agreement, which requires agencies to provide available emergency response services at no cost to any jurisdiction that requests them.

The emergency plan also describes the California Emergency Organization, which comprises the five SEMS organizational levels and the private sector as displayed in Figure A.1, and represents all resources available within the State that can

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**FIGURE A.1**

*California Emergency Organization*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEMS Levels</th>
<th>During a major emergency, operations are coordinated as follows:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Governor and State agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>OES administrative regions and mutual aid regions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operational area</td>
<td>County and all political subdivisions within the county</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Individual cities, counties, and other local jurisdictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>On-scene responders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Volunteer organizations, businesses, and individuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Emergency Plan.
respond to and recover from an emergency. The California Emergency Organization operates from emergency operations centers established at all levels of government, as well as in many businesses and industries. Resource requests for response and recovery originate at the lowest level and are progressively forwarded to the next level until filled. Additionally, when support requirements cannot be met with state resources, the State may request assistance from federal agencies.

The emergency plan also describes communications support procedures among the SEMS levels of the California Emergency Organization to provide information links during emergencies. This communications infrastructure includes the use of the Response Information Management System—a computerized information and resource tracking system—and the California portion of the National Warning System.

Emergency management, as described in the emergency plan, is performed in four phases. As Figure A.2 on the following page illustrates, the four phases comprise what the emergency plan refers to as the disaster cycle. The preparedness phase involves activities undertaken in advance of an emergency, developing operational capabilities and improving effective responses to a disaster. These preparatory activities include developing and revising disaster plans, training response personnel, and improving public information and communications systems. In the response phase, actions are taken to save lives, protect property, and minimize the effects of the disaster. Warning systems may be activated; resources may be mobilized, including mutual aid; and emergency operations centers may be activated. The recovery phase consists of both short-term activity intended to return vital life support systems to operation and long-term activity designed to return infrastructure systems to predisaster conditions. Finally, the mitigation phase includes a review of ways to eliminate or reduce the impact of future disasters, including the lessons learned from disasters the State encounters.
The second part of the emergency plan identifies the activities included in the response and recovery phases and identifies the roles of state agencies in fulfilling these activities. The activities are broken out into functional areas, including management, planning, operations, logistics, and finance/administration. These functions are integrated into the SEMS. The plan specifies the response and recovery activities required within each functional area and identifies each state agency that has either a leading or supporting role in fulfilling the activity. Table A.1 lists the functional areas and the related key activities.
### TABLE A.1

**Key State Response and Recovery Activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Activities</th>
<th>Recovery Activities</th>
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<td><strong>Management</strong></td>
<td><strong>Management</strong></td>
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<td>• Liaison</td>
<td>• Legislative liaison</td>
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<td>• Public information</td>
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<td>• Safety</td>
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<td><strong>Planning/Intelligence</strong></td>
<td><strong>Planning</strong></td>
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<td>• Situation status and analysis</td>
<td>• Situation status and analysis</td>
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<td>• Mobilization/demobilization</td>
<td>• Mobilization/demobilization</td>
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<td>• Advance planning</td>
<td>• Advance planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Technical specialists</td>
<td>• Action planning</td>
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<td><strong>Operations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Fire, rescue, and law enforcement</td>
<td>• Individual assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Medical and health services</td>
<td>• Public assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Care and shelter</td>
<td>• Hazard mitigation</td>
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<td>• Utilities and hazardous materials</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Logistics</strong></td>
<td><strong>Logistics</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Information systems and communications</td>
<td>• Information systems and communications</td>
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<td>• Transportation</td>
<td>• Transportation</td>
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<td>• Facilities coordination</td>
<td>• Facilities coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Resource tracking</td>
<td>• Resource tracking</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Finance/Administration</strong></td>
<td><strong>Finance/Administration</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Compensation and claims</td>
<td>• Compensation and claims</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Cost accounting</td>
<td>• Cost accounting</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Damage survey report record keeping</td>
<td>• Damage survey report record keeping</td>
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</table>

Source: State Emergency Plan.

OES developed the terrorism response plan as an annex to the emergency plan in March 1999 (and updated it in February 2001). Similar to the emergency plan, the terrorism response plan provides direction to state agencies and local governments within California involved in protecting public safety and preparing for and responding to terrorist events. Following are the stated objectives of the terrorism response plan:
• Provide a vehicle for establishing and maintaining a current and realistic assessment of the potential threat of terrorism in California.

• Outline the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of state and federal agencies in preparing for and responding to terrorist events.

• Provide planning, response, and recovery guidance that is consistent with the SEMS and national policy.

• Provide a basis for identifying needed training of personnel and exercising of local, state, and federal capabilities for responding to terrorist events.

The terrorism response plan incorporates the use of the SEMS in responding to terrorist events, consistent with the emergency plan. Accordingly, it describes how local and state agencies will interact during an emergency. It also describes how OES will respond to terrorist threats. Finally, it identifies the roles and responsibilities of state agencies that are likely to be called on in response to terrorist events. Table A.2 lists the roles and responsibilities of various state agencies.

The emergency plan and terrorism response plan provide the framework for the State’s response to emergencies, including terrorist events. Taken together, these plans appear to provide adequate guidance for responding to an act of terrorism.
### TABLE A.2

State Agency Roles and Responsibilities in Responding to Terrorist Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role/Responsibility</th>
<th>Air Resources Board</th>
<th>Conservation Corps</th>
<th>Corrections</th>
<th>Emergency Medical Services Authority</th>
<th>Emergency Services</th>
<th>Energy Commission</th>
<th>Environmental Health Hazard Assessment</th>
<th>Finance</th>
<th>Fish and Game</th>
<th>Food and Agriculture</th>
<th>Forestry and Fire Protection</th>
<th>General Services</th>
<th>Health Services</th>
<th>Highway Patrol</th>
<th>Industrial Relations</th>
<th>Integrated Waste Management Board</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>Public Utilities Commission</th>
<th>Social Services</th>
<th>Toxic Substances Control</th>
<th>Transportation</th>
<th>Water Resources Control Board</th>
<th>Youth Authority</th>
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*L = Lead role  
S = Support role
The Department of Fish and Game is the State’s lead agency for oil spills.

Source: Governor’s Office of Emergency Services’ terrorism response plan.
APPENDIX B

The California National Guard’s Homeland Security Strategy Defines Its Role and Objectives in Responding to Terrorism

In December 2002, the California National Guard (National Guard) developed the Homeland Security Strategy (Homeland Strategy), defining and planning for three functional areas in its response to terrorism. First, the National Guard must prepare for an event, establishing proper organization, direction, equipment, coordination, training, and resources. Second, the National Guard expects to be called on to help prevent the effects of terrorist events. Prevention involves supporting civil authorities through proactive efforts that may include education, protecting critical assets, helping to secure ports of entry, and reducing the impact on citizens of a terrorist event or attack. For example, the National Guard protected a fuel storage facility during the Super Bowl held in San Diego in January 2003. Finally, the National Guard will be called on to respond if a terrorist event occurs within the State.

The National Guard Is Making Progress on the Objectives It Has Identified

The Homeland Strategy describes three imperatives that the National Guard believes it must accomplish to be ready to respond to terrorism. The first imperative calls for the National Guard to identify and develop organizational capabilities to complete the planning and coordination needed to integrate with other responding agencies before, during, and after an event. The Homeland Strategy states that this may require adjustments in the current organization and training priorities of the National Guard units as well as a reallocation of resources to focus on the homeland security mission. Implied in this imperative is the National Guard’s belief that training and equipping its people to effectively respond to homeland security missions is important. According to the executive officer of the

Components of the National Guard’s Homeland Security Strategy

Functional areas:
• Preparing
• Preventing
• Responding

Imperatives:
• Identify organizational capabilities
• Secure adequate funding
• Clear legislative, policy, and regulatory hurdles
National Guard's homeland security office (executive officer), this imperative represents a paradigm shift that would mean the National Guard would no longer look like its U.S. Army counterparts. For example, the executive officer states that money spent equipping National Guard units with Bradley tanks, which are rarely needed to fight along with U.S. Army forces, could be diverted to fund items more commonly used in support of civil authorities, such as water purification equipment, and engineering and transportation units. However, he added that this change is controversial and is opposed by some high-level staff in both the National Guard and active forces; therefore, the National Guard may encounter difficulties effecting this change.

The second imperative presented in the Homeland Strategy is that the National Guard must secure adequate funding, from federal and nonfederal sources, to finance the training, equipment, manpower, and technology needed to prepare for, and prevent when possible, future terrorist events. The Homeland Strategy goes on to say that the National Guard cannot assume additional missions without resources; to do so would risk developing a false sense of security for the citizens and leadership of California. According to the executive officer, this imperative addresses the challenge the National Guard faces because of the federal Department of Defense's unwillingness to fund homeland security missions. He added that the secretary of the Department of Defense has maintained that its funds are for the National Guard's federal mission—fighting wars—and he does not want to get into the homeland security arena. When we talked to him in May 2003, the executive officer stated that he hoped to use federal funds that the National Guard expected to receive soon through the State's Office of Homeland Security to establish two positions that will primarily identify and secure funding for homeland security activities within the National Guard.

The third imperative the National Guard includes in its Homeland Strategy is that it must take all actions necessary to ensure that legislative, policy, and regulatory actions are completed to integrate the National Guard into the emergency response community and to protect its members from liability when responding to authorized homeland security missions. According to the executive officer, this imperative raises issues that are beyond the immediate control of the National Guard. As an example, the executive officer referred to an April 2002
opinion issued by the attorney general. The opinion states that, among other things, California law requires federal law enforcement officers to satisfy the training requirements of Penal Code Section 832 before they may exercise traditional peace officer powers within the State. The executive officer believes that this opinion would require National Guard members, as federal law enforcement officers, to receive the training described in the Penal Code before exercising traditional peace officer powers such as search and seizure, service of warrants, and certain types of arrests. However, the executive officer believes this training is expensive and therefore would be nearly impossible to offer to all National Guard members. The executive officer believes that issues pending before the U.S. Congress and the state Legislature, which affect the National Guard’s response to state missions, are also beyond the National Guard’s immediate control.

The Homeland Strategy further identifies 12 objectives that the National Guard needs to complete to accomplish its three imperatives and assume the homeland security mission. Although the National Guard has begun to address several of the objectives, the executive officer told us that many require actions from bodies outside the National Guard, such as the state Legislature and U.S. Congress; therefore, the National Guard has not yet fully accomplished many of the objectives. For each of the 12 objectives, the Homeland Strategy identifies the entities responsible for taking action and the date by which their efforts should be finished. Table B.1 on the following page presents the projected completion dates established in the Homeland Strategy and the status as of May 2003.

The first objective is to create a Ready Reaction Force that can quickly respond to state missions. The National Guard has recently implemented this force, and we discuss it in more detail later in this appendix. The National Guard has established its homeland security office, which is the second objective. According to the executive officer, as of May 2003, the office is staffed with six people on loan from other offices within the National Guard. He expects the office to obtain permanent staffing in December 2003.

The National Guard addressed its third, fifth, sixth, and 10th objectives in November 2002 when it developed an analysis of potential homeland security missions and identified more than
$156 million in additional training, materials, and personnel needs to meet these missions. The executive officer told us that the National Guard submitted this analysis to the federal National Guard Bureau for its consideration in funding the needs but as of June 2003 has not been informed whether the National Guard Bureau will fund these items. According to the executive officer, the analysis also partially addressed the eighth objective. However, he said that the National Guard is constrained in fully implementing this objective because of the barriers previously discussed in relation to the second imperative, which concern challenges the National Guard faces in funding homeland security missions. The fifth objective

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**TABLE B.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Projected End Date</th>
<th>Completed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Establish a Ready Reaction Force.</td>
<td>April 1, 2003</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Establish a National Guard homeland security office.</td>
<td>May 1, 2003</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Analyze mission response requirements and develop a plan to maximize military training systems.</td>
<td>May 1, 2003</td>
<td>✓*</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Reestablish a military field command training program.</td>
<td>June 1, 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Assess equipment capabilities and develop a readiness reporting system.</td>
<td>June 1, 2003</td>
<td>✓*</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Assess installations and infrastructure.</td>
<td>July 1, 2003</td>
<td>✓*</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Review current operational and legislative boundaries, and develop a state and federal legislative and policy plan.</td>
<td>July 1, 2003 (state)</td>
<td>✓†</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Analyze future known “warfight” and homeland security mission requirements, and develop a transformation plan to meet requirements.</td>
<td>October 1, 2003 (federal)</td>
<td>✓*</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Form collaborative partnerships to develop standardized training.</td>
<td>October 1, 2003</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Analyze equipment needs to effectively operate with other emergency responders.</td>
<td>October 1, 2003</td>
<td>✓*</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Identify and train liaison officers.</td>
<td>July 1, 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Develop a public awareness program to raise the visibility of its response capabilities.</td>
<td>July 1, 2004</td>
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* Analysis is complete; implementation is contingent on funding from federal or state sources and resolving the issue of the National Guard’s Department of Defense mission versus its homeland security mission, as discussed in the text of the report.

† The National Guard has developed state and federal legislative issues; action is contingent on the approval of the state Legislature and U.S. Congress.
The National Guard Has Also Developed an Operational Plan That Adequately Guides Its Responses to Emergencies

The National Guard responds to emergencies that occur within the State when directed to by the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES). To guide its responses to these missions, the National Guard has developed a plan of operations that identifies the basic concepts underlying responding to all missions and includes annexes that give guidelines for particular types of emergencies, including terrorism. The operational plan appears to provide an adequate level of guidance toward an organized and efficient response to state missions the National Guard receives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needs Identified in the National Guard Analysis of November 2002 (in Millions)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Additional staffing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear, biological, and chemical equipment</td>
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<td>Installation barriers</td>
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<td>Additional flying hours</td>
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<tr>
<td>Additional operations and maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ready Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear, biological, and chemical training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weapons qualification</td>
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<td>Communications equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explosive ordinance disposal equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sighting equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exercises</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hazardous materials and chemical training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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also called for the development of a readiness reporting system that tracks the availability of major equipment and other critical items in short supply. The Joint Operations Center completed this part of the objective when it developed a color-coded report that tracks these items, as well as the current capability of the National Guard personnel operating them.

The executive officer said that the National Guard has not yet addressed objective number four, which calls for reestablishing a training program that would assist National Guard field commanders in transferring their skills to commanders of state missions. The director of the Joint Operations Center advised us that implementing this objective is contingent on receiving state funds to pay for it. For objective number seven, the executive officer stated that the National Guard had developed the legislative issues that present obstacles to the National Guard in completing its homeland security mission but that it must work with the U.S. Congress and the state Legislature to effect change. He added that the National Guard would not be the driving force behind the accomplishment of the ninth objective. Rather, it must work in concert with other training organizations to develop standardized training and exercises. Finally, the executive officer said that addressing objectives 11 and 12 depends on the National Guard receiving the necessary funding.
The operational plan requires the National Guard to use the task force concept in developing a force to respond to state missions. Under the task force concept, the National Guard forms an ad hoc force from any of its available units, including Army Guard and Air Guard, based on the skills that the National Guard identifies as necessary to fulfill the mission it has been given. For example, members and equipment from an Air Guard wing might be put with members and equipment from an Army Guard company to form a task force that will respond to a state mission.

The National Guard’s operational response to various threats is developed in five phases. The operational plan also identifies potential missions and addresses administrative, logistical, command, and communications needs relative to a mission. Other annexes to the operational plan cover these same areas in the context of the type of emergency each annex addresses.

The terrorism annex to the operational plan identifies the following missions as among those likely that the National Guard will respond to:

- Area and point security and traffic control.
- Logistical support to emergency responders and to the civilian populace.
- Shelter for emergency responders and the civilian populace.
- Ground and aerial transportation and evacuation of emergency responders and the civilian populace.
- Support to local agencies that execute local emergency response plans.
- Communications support via wire and wireless means.
- Deployment of civil support teams in support of weapons of mass destruction activities, which may include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents.
The terrorism annex also describes the actions the task force responding to the terrorism mission will complete in the five phases of the National Guard response. It also establishes responsibilities for various elements within the National Guard to facilitate the mission.

Another annex to the operational plan describes the Ready Reaction Force. The National Guard established the Ready Reaction Force to quickly respond to certain emergencies occurring within the State. The Ready Reaction Force is composed of Army Guard and Air Guard units combined under the task force concept of operations discussed earlier. The National Guard has established a rotation for its various units to staff the Ready Reaction Force. Under this rotation, certain units will be responsible for responding as a Ready Reaction Force for a specified period, and then other units will assume the responsibility.

The State’s two civil support teams are designated as the initial response teams for the Ready Reaction Force. A civil support team is expected to respond to an emergency within four hours of notification by OES. The civil support team will maintain its response until a task force comprising Army Guard and/or Air Guard personnel and assets is established and responds, which will be within 24 hours of notification.

In addition to the operational plan, the National Guard developed procedures in February 2003 for its Joint Operations Center to follow in coordinating the National Guard’s response to state missions. These procedures delineate the roles and responsibilities of staff in the Joint Operations Center during a response to a state mission. The procedures appear to provide sufficient guidance to allow for a coordinated response to state missions.

The National Guard Has Developed a Process to Periodically Review and Update Its Operational Plan

In response to a concern we raised in a previous audit, the National Guard has recently implemented a process to review its operational plan annually, identify needed changes, and make updates as required.

In an audit released in February 2002, we reported that the National Guard did not have a process to annually review its emergency plans and update them when necessary. As a result, we recommended that the National Guard develop and implement a system to review and update its state emergency
plans annually. The National Guard Bureau, the federal agency that oversees state National Guard forces, requires such reviews and performs reviews of the National Guard's emergency plans but does not provide formal approval. Additionally, we reported that the National Guard had no process for ensuring that it implements recommendations identified in after action reports. An after action report, which is prepared by the task force that responds to a state mission, summarizes the mission, identifies problem areas the task force encountered, and recommends corrective actions to mitigate the problems in future missions. In our February 2002 audit, we recommended that the National Guard establish a process to track and implement corrective actions identified in after action reports.

In July 2002, the National Guard developed an operational plan that included annexes outlining its plans for various emergencies. Our subsequent review of these issues reveals that the National Guard has developed a process for reviewing its operational plan and implementing corrective actions from after action reports. It has developed an annual review cycle that begins March 1 each year and results in a revised plan to be effective July 1. The National Guard implemented this review process beginning in 2003. According to its director, the Joint Operations Center also uses the annexes in the operational plan to conduct internal exercises with other National Guard staff on a quarterly basis. These exercises may bolster the process of updating plans and give National Guard staff a chance to practice organizing emergency operations before an actual event occurs.

To assist in operational plan reviews, the National Guard is currently in the process of implementing a project management software program that will enable it to track operational plan reviews, ensuring that the plan is updated as appropriate and that corrective actions identified in after action reports are considered as updates occur. According to the National Guard’s acting director for information management, the software is being implemented in five phases. The acting director stated that as of June 2003, the National Guard was in the fourth and fifth phase and was nearing completion of the project.
Agency's comments provided as text only.

Office of Homeland Security
Office of the Governor
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814

July 18, 2003

Elaine M. Howle
California State Auditor
Bureau of State Audits
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 300
Sacramento, California 95814

Dear Ms. Howle:

Enclosed are the responses to the Terrorism Readiness Audit, No. 2002-117 for both the Offices of Homeland Security and Emergency Services. We have included this letter and the responses in the enclosed diskette.

Thank you for your time in this matter. Should you have any further questions or need any additional information, please contact Michael Levy, Deputy Director, at (916) 324-8908.

Sincerely,

(Signed by: George Vinson)

GEORGE VINSON
Director

Enclosure
Suggested Responses to BSA Audit 2002-117:

The Governor’s Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) agrees with each of the Bureau of State Audits’ (BSA) recommendations under Audit No. 2002-117. We would like to provide these responses to the following items in particular:

**OES Has No Formal Process to Periodically Review and Update the Terrorism Response Plan**

OES and OHS understand and appreciate the benefit of a formal schedule and process for reviewing and updating emergency plans to ensure that they are current, and both agencies are now drafting up such a process. Nonetheless, in addition to such a formal process, OES has had many informal opportunities in the last few years—perhaps more than if we had relied solely on a formal schedule—to test our plans for responding to disasters and emergencies. In addition to an informal review in March and other updates, OES, as mentioned later in this audit report, has activated its State Operations Center 48 times in the last several years. At the conclusion of those activations, OES has informally reviewed its plans to determine whether that activation required revisions.

**OES Has Not Identified the Training Needs for All of Its Staff**

OES agrees that a comprehensive training program should be developed and that critical staff training requirements should be identified. OES has in fact already taken steps to develop such a program agency-wide, including an assessment of training needs. Training Coordinator staff representing all OES branches have met and developed the draft core competencies, which form the basis of the needs assessment. The core competencies will be based on knowledge and skills necessary to carry out basic emergency management functions (i.e., staff positions in the REOC or SOC) as well as work in the OES office environment (e.g., knowledge of Lotus Notes, understanding what various OES branches do). A draft agency-wide training program has already been provided to OES Branch Managers for their input and is in the process of being forwarded to the OES Director for his approval. We anticipate finalizing this program by the end of December, 2003 with the intent of implementing it January 1, 2004.

Individual managers and supervisors will supplement this training program with technical training requirements specific to the individual employee/branch needs. Individual supervisors will be required to review their staff’s training records against the core competencies included in the agency-wide program, identify shortfalls, and address remediation of the shortfalls in future individual training plans.

**OES Has Not Conducted State-level Terrorism Readiness Exercises as Called for In Its Terrorism Response Plan**

As recommended, OES will continue to pursue any funding opportunities for exercises as well as work with the National Guard to establish an effective exercise program that includes SOC and REOC exercise opportunities for OES personnel and personnel from other state agencies with critical terrorism emergency response roles. (It should be noted that the $1.6 million in federal exercise funding cited in the report is the State’s share of the FFY 2003 exercise funds for the benefit of state agency and rural area first responders; an additional $6.3 million was provided to the locals...
As mentioned by the BSA, while OES has in the past lacked funding to sponsor terrorism readiness exercises, we have actively participated in exercises sponsored by other agencies that have been beneficial to state and local preparedness. The RAND exercise, for example, allowed state and federal agencies to discuss and review policy issues related to the State’s response to a terrorist incident, consistent with SEMS, the State Emergency Plan, and the Federal Response Plan. OES’ role in the exercise was broader than just “providing input to the exercise design” as noted in the report; the role included modification of the scenario to assure it was relevant to emergency response practices in California, development of questions used to facilitate discussion, coordination with state and California-based federal agency representatives. At this exercise, OES staff served as facilitators of the various discussion groups and key staff from OES and other state agencies participated as players in the tabletop exercise.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Bureau of State Audits draft report titled, “Terrorism Readiness: The Office of Homeland Security, Office of Emergency Services, and the California National Guard Need to Improve Their Readiness to Address Terrorism.”

The Audit Team conducted a professional and thorough review, and identified areas where we can improve our support to the State and our response to federal mobilizations. Attached is the Military Department’s response to the recommendations made in the draft report.

As the report identifies, most of the training performed by the California National Guard is federally funded and designed to prepare this organization to meet its federal mission. Although these federal missions are not specifically terrorism readiness, California National Guard members can use the specialty skills they obtain during their federal training to respond to state emergency missions. The California National Guard has and will in the future use the federal skills possessed by its forces to respond to all State emergencies to include terrorist events.

With the increases in military actions abroad, and the demonstrated potential deployment of the California National Guard in response to homeland security, the California National Guard is significantly challenged to balance these two sometimes complimentary, sometimes conflicting mission requirements. In December 2002, the California National Guard developed the Homeland Security Strategy, which identifies the objectives we must achieve to prepare for, help prevent, and respond to terrorist events within the State.

We have received a grant from the Office of Homeland Security through The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. Funding through this grant will allow for the California National Guard to support objectives of the Homeland Security Strategy by purchasing critical equipment and financing first responder exercises and training classes.

If more information is needed related to the California National Guard’s responses in the attachment, Major Louise Goodwater remains the point of contact at (916) 854-3820.

Sincerely,

(Signed by: Paul D. Monroe, Jr.)

Paul D. Monroe, Jr.
Major General
The Adjutant General

Enclosure
The following Military Department responses are provided for each of the five auditor recommendations included in the draft audit report.

**Auditor Recommendation No. 1:**

Determine the most critical training its Joint Operations Center staff need to fulfill their duties and then allocate existing funding or seek the needed funding to provide the training documenting why it is needed.

**Military Department Response:**

The Federal training requirements for each position in the Joint Operation Center (JOC) are funded and scheduled through either the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard. While this training is ongoing and never really complete, the personnel in the JOC are current with Federal training requirements. Attached is a Critical Training Course Matrix that includes both required federal and self selected civilian courses which will enhance JOC personnel's ability to interact with and support civilian agencies. The self selected courses have not been mandated by any agency. While trying to set a national standard, this additional expertise is not required for the National Guard's federal missions and therefore must be funded by the state. Education is scheduled to the extent that current budget allows. On the job training is used where possible and on-line courses that require no cost are listed for individuals to take on their own time. The Military Department has and will continue to pursue additional funding outside the Department in support of Joint Operations training.

**Auditor Recommendation No. 2:**

Develop guidance for its Army Guard Division to implement its terrorism readiness force protection program.

**Military Department Response:**

The Army Division, Operations and Training Officer, has been tasked with publishing command guidance to insure critical tasks 1 through 5 from Army Regulation 525-13 are fully implemented within all California Army National Guard units by 31 December 2004. In June 2003, California Army National Guard included the task “Homeland Security” with the sub-tasks “Weapons of Mass Destruction (Terrorism)” and “Ready Reaction Force” within the Mission Essential Task List (METL) and these tasks were briefed by the subordinate unit commanders at the Army Division Yearly Training Briefs. In addition, Army Division has requested State Homeland Security (HLS) funds from the Joint Staff to conduct individual and unit training to include exercise participation.
**Auditor Recommendation No. 3:**

Ensure that its Joint Staff Division, including the Joint Operations Center, share best practices between its Air Guard and Army Guard divisions.

**Military Department Response:**

Chief of Staffs for Army, Air and Joint Divisions meet once a week to brief the Chief of Staff for the California National Guard. Any significant changes to regulations and/or instructions that affect Army, Air or Joint Divisions will be added to the briefing agenda and discussed amongst the Chiefs. As the JOC identifies best practices in either service, they will be brought to the attention of the Chief of Staff, Joint Division.

**Auditor Recommendation No. 4:**

Use the recent awarded funds from OHS to identify the type and frequency of state-level exercises responding to terrorist events that the State needs to be adequately prepared. The National Guard should then provide the exercises it has identified.

**Military Department Response:**

The Military Department has received funding in the amount of $1,579,000 from a State Homeland Security Grant for civil/military exercises. While the money will not be available until there is a state budget in place, the Military Department's Homeland Security Directorate has already started planning for a minimum of one state-level exercise per quarter and coordination has begun with a number of civilian agencies, i.e. Los Angeles County: Sheriff, Emergency Operations Center and Emergency Management Office and Stanislaus County Sheriff. An application has been submitted through the California Office of Emergency Services to the United States Department of Homeland Security for a second grant to fund additional state and local level exercises. It should be pointed out that both grants are funded to support civil exercises with military support, not solely for training exercises for the Military Department.

**Auditor Recommendation No. 5:**

The National Guard should continue to monitor the results of its recruiting and retention efforts. If those efforts begin to adversely affect its ability to respond to missions, it should seek legislative or other remedies to address its problems.

**Military Department Response:**

Monitoring recruiting and retention for both the Army and Air Divisions is an ongoing process throughout the California National Guard. Recruiting and retention reports are submitted and briefed on a monthly basis to the Commanders of both Army and Air. Current management controls over recruiting and retention ensure adequate readiness capability within the California National Guard.
Military Department, Joint Operation Center
Critical Training Matrix

The following training courses include both required federal and self selected civilian instructions which will enhance JOC personnel’s ability to interact with and support civilian agencies.

JOC Training Instruction

Anti-Terrorism Awareness Training

9mm Familiarization

Disaster Basics (FEMA, Web Based)

Basic Incident Command (FEMA, Web Based)

EOC’s Role in Emergencies (FEMA, Web Based)

Principles of Emergency MNGT (FEMA, Web Based)

Community Disaster EX (FEMA, Web Based)

State Disaster MNGT (FEMA, Web Based)

Emergency Manager (FEMA, Web Based)

Emergency Preparedness (FEMA, Web Based)

Exercise Design (FEMA, Web Based)

Special Events Planning (FEMA, Web Based)

Emergency Planning (FEMA, Web Based)
cc: Members of the Legislature
Office of the Lieutenant Governor
Milton Marks Commission on California State
Government Organization and Economy
Department of Finance
Attorney General
State Controller
State Treasurer
Legislative Analyst
Senate Office of Research
California Research Bureau
Capitol Press